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THE COMPETING PARADIGMS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION
JAMES J. PARK†
ABSTRACT
Although the securities industry is primarily regulated by specific
rules, it is also governed by general principles. When conduct violates
a rule, the regulatory response is obvious—enforce the rule. The issue
is more difficult when conduct does not violate a rule but violates a
principle. A regulator can excuse the conduct on the ground that the
law is unclear and prohibit the conduct going forward through
rulemaking. Or, the regulator can punish the conduct through what I
call a “principles-based” enforcement action. Since 2002, there has
been a surge of principles-based enforcement actions, provoking
criticism that regulators are engaging in “Regulation by
Enforcement.” This Article compares these regulatory tools and
proposes criteria to guide regulators in choosing between them in
communicating legal norms to the regulated.
These approaches represent two paradigms that must coexist but
can also compete. Rulemaking reflects the mentality that securities
regulation is a technical enterprise that should be left to experts who
have created a comprehensive, efficient administrative scheme.
Principles-based enforcement actions reflect the demand that
regulators punish conduct that violates principles reflecting public
values. For the most part, the regulated prefer a predictable regulatory
regime, which rulemaking provides, whereas the public prefers
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decisive responses, which principles-based enforcement actions
provide.
Based on these preferences, public choice theory would contend
that regulators are more likely to address arguable misconduct by
aggressively enforcing principles when public influence is high, while
utilizing rulemaking when the regulated are influential. But this
account is too simplistic—although the relative strength of interest
groups can affect the incentives of regulators, their choices are subject
to significant constraints. For example, a regulator cannot credibly
bring a principles-based enforcement action without uncovering
specific evidence of misconduct.
Even if regulators are so constrained, they should counter the
perception that their choices are made to appease interest groups by
considering the circumstances in which principles-based enforcement
is appropriate. In doing so, regulators should take into account both
the need for a predictable regulatory regime and the need to punish
conduct that violates principles. They should consider: (1) whether the
principle being enforced is well established or novel, (2) whether the
application of the principle is consistent with existing rules, (3)
whether there is compelling evidence establishing the misconduct, and
(4) whether the conduct caused foreseeable public harm.
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Since 2002, there have been an unprecedented number of
innovative securities enforcement actions directed at areas arguably
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unregulated by rules. For their proponents, these actions have
punished companies for conduct that violated fundamental principles.
For their critics, these actions have been disruptive and circumvented
a rulemaking system that gives companies notice and an opportunity
to shape legal norms. These arguments reveal conflicting views about
a regulatory system built on both rules and principles.1 This Article
analyzes these competing paradigms and how regulators choose
2
between them in communicating legal norms to the regulated. It
offers a framework to guide the regulatory response to misconduct
that does not clearly violate a rule.
For the most part, the securities industry is regulated by specific
requirements set forth in rules. There is a rule requiring broker3
dealer firms to maintain a certain amount of capital. There are rules

1. In the realm of securities regulation, the distinction between rules and principles has
been discussed in terms of whether the regulatory scheme should shift from a rules-based
system to a principles-based system. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION,
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 8–9 (2006)
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION], available at http://www.
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (advocating a shift from
prescriptive rules to broader principles); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 342–43 (2004) (“SarbanesOxley ushers in and accelerates a major and probably inevitable transition, which will move us
from a rules-based system of financial disclosure to a principles-based system.”); Cristie Ford,
New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970130 (analyzing Canada’s consideration of
principles-based regulation). Lawrence Cunningham argues persuasively that no system is
entirely rules-based or entirely principles-based. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription
to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and
Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct.–Nov. 2007).
The distinction between rules and principles is amorphous. Ronald Dworkin simply refers
to “principles” as “the whole set of . . . standards other than rules . . . .” RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). While this Article uses the rules/principles distinction, it
does not attempt to precisely define it or take a position on whether a rules-based system is
better than a principles-based system. Instead, its focus is on the regulatory tools of rulemaking
and enforcement, which have distinguishable procedural characteristics.
2. Such decisions have been referred to as a “choice in policymaking form” by M.
Elizabeth Magill in an article describing how courts give agencies such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) wide discretion in choosing between regulatory tools such as
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of
Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1437 (2004). Magill notes that little has been
written about the way in which regulators choose between rulemaking and enforcement. Id. at
1442–43 (“There are few efforts to describe or explain how agencies choose among their
available policymaking forms.”); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (noting that
administrative law theories “fail to incorporate any well developed vision of the administrative
process—that is, of administrative law and administrative practice”).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3–1 (2007).
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listing in exhaustive detail the facts a company must disclose when
4
issuing securities. There is a rule requiring investment advisers to
register with securities regulators before advising clients.5 There are
rules prohibiting specific types of manipulation of securities
6
offerings. These rules are part of an extensive administrative scheme
and were passed after a deliberative process in which industry was
given notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity to comment.
Simultaneously, the securities industry is governed by broad
7
principles largely set forth in statutes and the common law. Fraud, an
open-ended concept, has long been prohibited.8 Broker-dealers are
required to conform to high standards of commercial trade and
9
honor. Investment advisers are required to act as fiduciaries with
respect to their customers.10 Principles are largely defined through an
adversarial enforcement process that can be more rapid than
rulemaking but can also cause significant disruption.
When conduct violates a rule, the regulatory response is clear—
enforce the rule. But what if a securities regulator uncovers
misconduct that was previously unregulated or arguably does not
violate a particular rule, what I will refer to as “arguable

4. Id. pts. 210, 228.
5. Id. § 240.15.
6. Id. §§ 242.100–.105.
7. Because rules themselves can set forth principles, I distinguish rules reflecting general
principles from rules that make specific prescriptions, which have been referred to as
“prescriptive rules.” See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1,
at 8; MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL
LEADERSHIP 3–5, 95–129, available at http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/
pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf. I include rules reflecting
principles in the category of “principles.” When I refer to “rules” I am referring only to
“prescriptive rules.”
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (prohibiting certain deceptive devices); see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (noting that legislative history described section 10(b) as a
“catchall” clause enabling the SEC “to deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.”
(internal quotations omitted)); The Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 et seq. (McKinney
2006).
9. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2110,
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
10. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2000); see also SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to
expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or
unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.”); EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 11 (2005) (discussing the common-law fiduciary duty).
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11

misconduct”? The target asserts it did not have adequate notice that
its conduct was wrong in relation to existing rules. But there is a case
that the conduct violates a broader principle. Should the regulator
respond by excusing the conduct but subsequently making it clear
that the conduct is prohibited through rulemaking? Or should the
regulator punish the conduct and enforce the broader principle
through what I call a “principles-based enforcement action”?12
This is not just a theoretical choice. When responding to
pervasive conflicts of interest caused by the close relationship
between equity research and investment banking, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) initially responded by proposing new
13
rules to regulate that relationship. The New York Attorney General
chose to pursue an investigation, resulting in a principles-based
enforcement action, significant penalties, and structural reform.14
In a number of other areas, securities regulators15 have
dramatically shifted in their response to arguable misconduct, acting
through principles-based enforcement actions rather than
rulemaking.16 This new pattern reverses the prior regulatory

11. There are obviously different degrees of “arguable misconduct,” and I do not attempt
to precisely define the term.
12. In contrast, straightforward enforcement of a rule can be called a “rules-based
enforcement action.”
13. See Charles Gasperino & Michael Schroeder, Pitt and Spitzer Butted Heads to Overhaul
Wall Street Research, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at A1 (“The SEC chairman believed that the
solution to the problem was developing a new set of standards for analysts, while at the same
time directing self-regulatory organizations, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange, to examine conflicts of interest and draw up new
rules on analyst compensation and disclosure practices.”).
14. See id. Of these three results, this Article focuses on the initial decision to punish
arguable misconduct with a principles-based enforcement action. I leave analysis of the
imposition of penalties and structural reforms resulting from such actions for another day.
15. In this Article, when I refer to “securities regulators,” I include not only the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) but also state securities regulators such as the New York
Attorney General as well as self-regulatory organizations such as the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Of course, there are
differences in the ways that state regulators and the SEC regulate. For example, only the SEC
can pass nationwide rules. Although state regulators cannot pass such rules, they have the
choice of deferring to SEC rulemaking rather than bringing a principles-based enforcement
action. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to these actors collectively and leave the implications of
the trend toward increased state involvement in securities regulation for another day.
16. See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3,
2003) (undocketed) [hereinafter Canary Complaint], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., No.
02-90 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter CSFB Complaint]; Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in
Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, In re
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approach, which saw rulemaking as the primary source of legal norms
17
that comes necessarily before enforcement actions. For example, in
the late 1990s, regulators responded to reports that companies were
selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to favored
research analysts by passing a rule making it clear that the conduct
was wrong rather than by punishing the conduct through enforcement
18
actions.
Skeptics have attacked these principles-based actions as
19
“Regulation by Enforcement,” a phrase criticizing the tendency of

Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Dinallo
Aff.]; Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Speech to the 24th Annual Ray
Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute, Chi, Ill. (Apr. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm (“[A]ll but three of the 12 penalties of $50
million or more obtained in Commission settlements since 1986 were obtained in the last twelve
months.”).
17. This emphasis on rulemaking was part of a general trend among administrative
agencies. See Magill, supra note 2, at 1398 (“[B]y the mid-1970s, rulemaking was the primary
and preferred mode of making policy for many agencies.”). The shift by securities regulators to
principles-based enforcement actions may be part of a more general trend toward using
litigation as a policymaking tool. Id. (“Some [scholars] point to the rise of agency litigation as a
strategy for achieving regulatory objectives.”).
18. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2007).
19. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 9
(“Enforcement actions in recent years have been used as a basis for ad hoc rule-writing.”);
Jonathan R. Macey, Who is Protecting the Investor?: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 128 n.36 (2004) (“Rulemaking by enforcement refers to the
presumptively illegitimate process by which regulators proceed with rulemaking ‘ex post,’ i.e.
after certain conduct occurs, rather than through more legitimate formal notice-and-rulemaking
procedures.”); Daniel Dunaief, SEC to Set Tough Analyst Rules, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 10,
2003, at 68 (“There are a lot of smart people who haven’t been consulted . . . [t]his is regulation
by enforcement.” (quoting Saul Cohen, partner at the firm Proskauer Rose)); Michael G. Oxley,
Letter to the Editor, Who Should Police the Financial Markets?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at B11
(“In this time of lagging investor confidence, policymaking through litigation discussed in a
closed conference room is not healthy for the U.S. capital markets, and not good for
investors.”); Tom Petruno, SEC, Fund Firm May Face Off, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at C1 (“A
key question is whether the Republican majority on the commission would consider a solid case,
or an example of what some SEC critics label ‘regulation by enforcement’—rewriting industry
rules by suing a particular party instead of simply ordering changes for all players.”); Stephen
M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and
Securities Law Symposium (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch022103smc.htm (“As an enforcement lawyer, I am quite familiar with the complaint raised
by defendants or respondents, and even by an occasional SEC Commissioner, that a proposed
settlement amounts to rulemaking by enforcement.”); Karen Donovan, Under Siege,
REGISTERED REP., Sept. 1, 2005, http://registeredrep.com/regulatory/finance_siege/ (“The
defense bar alleges that regulators are now making up rules as they go along, a phenomenon
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securities regulators to establish norms ex post through enforcement
20
actions rather than ex ante through rulemaking. The “Regulation by
Enforcement” critique notes that enforcement actions can cause
significant economic disruption. Industry may be unfairly surprised
when regulators advance broad principles in novel ways through
enforcement. Also, by developing regulatory norms through
enforcement, regulators sidestep the extensive administrative scheme
comprised of rules constructed through expert input and deliberation.
For the most part, the regulated prefer the rulemaking process
because it is more predictable and can be influenced. Rulemaking is
premised on the assumption that experts should construct costeffective norms in collaboration with industry, reflecting what I call
an administrative paradigm. On the other hand, the public prefers
principles-based enforcement actions because they are decisive.
Principles-based enforcement actions offer a more confrontational
approach directed at conduct that violates societal values, reflecting
what I call the public values paradigm. Although these two paradigms
must coexist, there are times when they compete.
Given these preferences, public choice theory predicts that
regulators will be more likely to respond to arguable misconduct with
rulemaking when the influence of the regulated is high and more
likely to respond with principles-based enforcement when public
influence is high. Over time, there may be a feedback effect that
results in regulatory cycles. A period in which a more passive

they call ‘regulation by enforcement.’ The enforcement cases keep coming, even as the SEC
proposes rules to broaden and clarify duties that it says [broker-dealers] have been violating.”).
The role of litigation in establishing norms has been an issue in other areas such as
environmental regulation. E.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak,
Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 248–50 (2005) (analyzing when
agencies such as the EPA decide whether to use rulemaking versus litigation to promulgate
norms). See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Vicusi ed., 2002)
(analyzing the formation of norms in tobacco regulation, firearms, lead-based paint hazards,
breast implants, malpractice and legal reform); Thomas O. McGarity, Douglas Kysar & Karen
Sokol, The Truth about Torts: Lawyers, Guns, and Money, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM PUBLICATION, July 2006, at 3 (criticizing regulation by litigation trope); Robert B.
Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE, Feb. 11,
1999, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=regulation_is_out_litigation_is_in (discussing
tobacco and handgun litigations and observing: “The era of big government may be over, but
the era of regulation through litigation has just begun.”).
20. See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982) (first setting forth the
”Regulation by Enforcement” critique). A later article coined the phrase “Regulation by
Enforcement.” See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 149 (1990).

02__PARK.DOC

2007]

12/20/2007 10:10:17 AM

SECURITIES REGULATION

633

rulemaking approach dominates may lead to regulatory gaps,
aggressive conduct that harms the public, and public outrage. On the
other hand, a period of aggressive principles-based enforcement
actions may lead to the exhaustion of cases in which there is evidence
of specific wrongdoing, criticisms of regulatory overreaching, and
mobilization by the regulated.
But the public choice account, which implies that regulatory
choices are essentially efforts to appease different interests, is
incomplete. Regulators are constrained in their choice between
rulemaking and principles-based enforcement by the nature of the
facts they uncover. To the extent that allegations of misconduct are
generalized and theoretical, rulemaking may be a more appropriate
initial response because there may be no basis for a principles-based
enforcement action. In contrast, when there is specific evidence of
serious misconduct, it is difficult for regulators to ignore such
evidence to appease industry. Of course, regulators may have greater
incentives and ability to initiate aggressive investigations when there
is public pressure, but their decision to act is not solely based on
meeting the preferences of interest groups.
Even if they are so constrained, regulators should be aware of
the public choice critique and counter it by considering certain
criteria to guide their choice between rulemaking and principlesbased enforcement. In doing so, they should consider the regulatory
needs for predictability and the punishment of conduct that violates
principles. This Article offers a framework that considers the
concerns raised by the administrative and public values paradigms
and guides regulators in choosing between rulemaking and principlesbased enforcement actions in communicating legal norms to the
regulated.
In determining whether to respond to arguable misconduct with
a principles-based enforcement action rather than rulemaking,
regulators should consider: (1) whether the applicable principle is
novel or well defined; (2) whether the application of the principle is
consistent with existing rules; (3) whether there is compelling
evidence of misconduct; and (4) whether the misconduct caused
significant, foreseeable public harm.
I illustrate the application of these factors to five ways in which
conduct interacts with rules and principles: (1) conduct violates a
principle set forth in a rule; (2) conduct violates both a rule and a
principle; (3) conduct is in an area that is unregulated by rules, does
not violate a rule, but violates a principle; (4) conduct is in an area
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that is heavily regulated by rules, does not violate a rule, but violates
a principle; and (5) conduct is sanctioned by a rule but violates a
principle. Regulators should be most inclined to use principles-based
enforcement actions in scenario (1) and least inclined to use
principles-based enforcement actions in scenario (5).
In Part I, I describe how for a period during the 1990s,
rulemaking was the likely response to arguable misconduct. I discuss
the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique to illustrate the distinction
between rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions as
regulatory tools. I illustrate the influence of the “Regulation by
Enforcement” critique through the case of Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure), in which the SEC chose a rulemaking rather than a
principles-based enforcement response to arguable misconduct.
In Part II, I describe the resurgence of principles-based
enforcement actions that began in 2002. In three major areas,
government regulators responded to arguable misconduct through
aggressive principles-based enforcement actions.
In Part III, I argue that the regulated generally prefer
rulemaking and the public generally prefers principles-based
enforcement actions. The rulemaking and principles-based
enforcement approaches respectively represent two distinct
regulatory paradigms, an administrative and a public values
paradigm, reflecting different views about the process of generating
legal norms as well as their substance.
In Part IV, I analyze how regulators choose between rulemaking
and principles-based enforcement actions. Public choice theory would
predict that the choice is largely determined by the relative influence
of the public and of the regulated. These influences can shift over
time, causing regulatory cycles. I argue that this account is incomplete
and that regulators are more constrained in their choice of regulatory
response than an uncritical application of public choice theory would
predict. I offer a framework to guide regulators in deciding how to
choose between rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions
in communicating legal norms to the regulated.
I. THE REIGN OF RULEMAKING
The main advantage of a rules-based regulatory regime is its
predictability. The regulated can make decisions without worrying
that their actions will be second-guessed by regulators. When
regulators develop norms through enforcement actions, they insert
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uncertainty into the system. This basic idea was set forth forcefully by
the influential “Regulation by Enforcement” critique.
A. The “Regulation by Enforcement” Critique
The first form of the critique was set forth in a 1982 book by
former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel, Regulation by
21
Prosecution. In that book, Karmel criticized the tendency of the SEC
to make policy through enforcement actions rather than through
rulemaking. As a result, she argued, the SEC was unnecessarily
antagonistic toward business and pursued cases that were only
tenuously related to securities regulation. She gave examples such as
enforcement actions in the 1970s against companies for paying bribes
in foreign countries in which the SEC tried to expand its jurisdiction
to areas tangentially related to the securities laws.22
Harvey Pitt, a leading securities law practitioner who later
became SEC Chairman, advanced the next variation of the critique.
In the 1990 article Regulation by Enforcement, Pitt and his coauthor,
Karen Shapiro, used the phrase to criticize the SEC’s efforts against
insider trading. Pitt and Shapiro defined “Regulation by
Enforcement” as the SEC’s practice of using “enforcement
proceedings to develop new legal theories and remedies.”23 As
Karmel had observed earlier,24 Pitt and Shapiro noted that
[t]he SEC has, at times, resorted to ad hoc enforcement of the
federal securities laws in particular contexts, in the absence of
meaningful advance guidance (or warning) to those subject to the
agency’s jurisdiction, in large measure because of the agency’s

21. KARMEL, supra note 20.
22. Id. at 146–59.
23. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 155 (emphasis omitted). An article in the
environmental law context refers to the strategy as “Regulation-by-litigation,” where
[r]ather than issue a proposed rule or invite affected parties to negotiate, an agency
sues one or more regulated entities, charging them with violation of an existing
statute, regulation or common law rule. The lawsuit is often based on a novel
interpretation of the statute or regulation and may concern behavior that the
regulated entities believe the agency has accepted in the past. Using the threat of
substantial liability for the alleged breach, the agency then persuades or coerces the
regulated entity to agree to a consent decree or injunctive relief that includes
imposition of substantive regulatory provisions.
Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 19, at 203.
24. KARMEL, supra note 20, at 95–98.

02__PARK.DOC

636

12/20/2007 10:10:17 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:625

institutional fear that any specific regulations it might promulgate
25
could prove underinclusive or susceptible of easy evasion.

Pitt and Shapiro characterized the SEC’s efforts against insider
26
trading as “Regulation by Enforcement.” Insider trading was and
still is an offense for which the SEC and Congress have not precisely
defined the applicable legal norm.27 Instead, the body of law
governing insider trading was created in an ad hoc way through
enforcement actions pursued by SEC staff and approved by lower
courts.28 As a result, Pitt and Shapiro argued, individuals do not have
29
clear notice as to what conduct qualifies as insider trading.
According to Pitt and Shapiro, securities regulators are inclined
to proceed by enforcement actions because it is easier to bring an
action retrospectively against specific acts than prospectively craft
rules relating to a wide array of conduct. But “Regulation by
Enforcement” raises concerns in that “notions of due process require
ample, advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be
prohibited, before any person may be civilly or criminally prosecuted
30
for a violation of those standards.”
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique held up rulemaking
as the ideal generator of norms governing the securities industry,
explaining:
[R]egulations prescribe, in advance of their application, normative
standards of conduct to which persons subject to agency jurisdiction
must adhere in the future. Enforcement powers apply existing rules
to past facts, to assure compliance with regulatory standards, both
by the entity subject to the standard (but accused of noncompliance)
and by other entities similarly situated. In a proper context, an
administrative agency should define normative standards first, offer
interpretive guidance second (to the extent feasible), and compel
obedience to those standards as a last resort, when it is clear that
those standards have been well publicized and comprehended, but
31
disregarded.

25. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 156.
26. See id. at 199–200.
27. See id. at 206–08 (analyzing the pitfalls of possible definitions). While making this
observation, Pitt and Shapiro do not propose a definition.
28. See id. at 207–08.
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted).
31. Id.
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The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique reflects a general sense
that norms are best initiated by rulemaking whereas enforcement
actions should merely enact previously defined rules.
There is evidence that the critique influenced SEC policy. After
the early form of the critique, in the 1980s, the SEC shifted from
prosecuting companies to focusing on insider trading, which involves
wrongdoing by individuals rather than companies.32 This effort against
insider trading in turn provoked Pitt and Shapiro’s “Regulation by
Enforcement” critique, which was influential in the 1990s. A 2005
study observes that prior to 2002, SEC enforcement actions tended to
target companies with smaller market capitalization than did private
33
plaintiffs. Even when it was given new statutory powers to seek civil
monetary penalties in 1990,34 the SEC used the power sparingly over
the next decade against public companies.35 This tendency might

32. See id. at 199–201 (describing insider trading as the “Centerpiece of the Enforcement
Program of the 1980s” and observing that “[i]nsider trading cases provided a ready vehicle for
pursuing individuals rather than issuers, since it was thought that, only in the rare case, if at all,
would a company play a role in insider trading other than as the source or object of the
information in question”).
That is not to say that the SEC was not bringing enforcement actions during this period.
Indeed, the SEC’s action against the NASD in 1996 for anticompetitive practices was a major
principles-based enforcement action. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 698–701 (3d ed. 2003). But it appears that for the most part, the focus
was on areas directed at individuals or smaller firms such as “microcap or penny stock fraud and
day trading abuses as well as traditional areas such as unregistered securities, financial fraud,
and insider trading.” Id. at 638 (footnote omitted).
33. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the
Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 897–98
(2005). Post-2002, the study shows that the SEC has begun targeting much larger companies. Id.
at 901–02.
34. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Prior to this statute, the
impact of enforcement actions was also limited by the remedies regulators had at their disposal.
See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 295 (“Under the Commission’s old enforcement
program, which emphasized injunctive relief, and permitted defendants to walk away from
litigation by promising to do what the law already required those defendants to do (namely, to
obey the law), without any acknowledgment of wrongdoing, the prospects of settlement were
quite high.”); see also Cutler, supra note 16 (“[U]ntil very recently, the Commission necessarily
relied almost exclusively on forward-looking relief, such as federal court injunctions, orders of
disgorgement, and remedial undertakings such as procedural reforms and independent
monitors, to enforce compliance with securities laws.”).
35. See Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What
Is Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 587, 596–97 (2005) (“It has been observed that in
the decade or so following the enactment of the Remedies Act, the SEC did not often seek or
obtain penalties against public companies.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:
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indicate that the SEC was focusing on unsophisticated individuals and
smaller companies with problems complying with basic rules because
they did not have the legal resources and reputational capital of
larger companies.
B. The Case of Regulation FD
The influence of the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique is
illustrated by the passage of Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure). In the
late 1990s the SEC discovered that “many issuers [we]re disclosing
important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of
earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional
investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same
information to the general public.”36 Such selective disclosure resulted
in profitable trading on the information before it was released to the
broader market.
Selective disclosure was only arguably misconduct because
although it implicates similar concerns as insider trading in that
favored individuals were able to profit solely by virtue of their
position, it was not entirely clear that it constituted insider trading
under existing doctrine. Under a 1983 Supreme Court case, Dirks v.
37
SEC, for insider trading liability to attach, the tipper (who
disseminates the information) needs to breach a fiduciary duty, or
38
obtain some kind of personal benefit or gain. A company, who is the
tipper in this situation, does not gain in the same way as the
paradigmatic corporate insider who reveals insider information in
exchange for money or a share of the profits. A company, however,
arguably gains from the selective disclosure of information because it
strengthens relationships with analysts or investors who shape the
public perception of the company.
The SEC could have responded to the evidence of selective
disclosure by bringing enforcement actions against the most egregious
examples of such conduct and arguing for an extension of insider
“It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409–10 & n.33 (2002) (noting that the
SEC pursued individuals rather than the Big Five accounting firms during the 1990s); Cox &
Thomas, supra note 33, at 897–98 (discussing the SEC’s tactics in using its expanded statutory
powers).
36. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
37. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. Id. at 661–62.
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trading doctrine. Instead, it chose to address the problem through a
process similar to that advanced by the proponents of the
“Regulation by Enforcement” critique. It proposed and promulgated
a rule prohibiting companies from intentionally disclosing nonpublic
information to a select group of insiders without releasing it at the
same time to the general public.39 SEC staff then made an effort to
40
publicize the types of conduct it would be targeting.
In doing so, the SEC was clear that the “Regulation by
Enforcement” critique was a factor in choosing a rulemaking
approach. In the final rule release, it explained:
Some commenters contended that rulemaking on this topic was
an inappropriately broad response to the issue. They suggested
instead that we use existing tools (namely, the law of insider trading)
to bring individual enforcement actions in those cases that appear to
involve significant selective disclosures. While we have considered
this approach . . . we do not agree that this is the appropriate
response to the legal uncertainties posed by current insider trading
law. In other contexts, we have been criticized for attempting to
“make new law” in an uncertain area by means of enforcement
action and urged instead to seek to change the law through noticeand-comment rulemaking. We believe that this rulemaking is the
more careful and considered response to the problem presented by
41
selective disclosure.

The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique led the SEC to
address the problem of selective disclosure through a new rule rather
than enforcement actions. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the
“Regulation by Enforcement” critique had some influence.
C. Rulemaking vs. Principles-Based Enforcement
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique implicitly assumes
that rulemaking is more legitimate than enforcement and should

39. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2007).
40. Richard H. Walker, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC: Regulation FD—An Enforcement
Perspective (Nov. 1, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm.
41. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718 (citations omitted). In
a lecture panel presentation discussing Regulation FD, Harvey Goldschmid, who was General
Counsel of the SEC when Regulation FD was first presented, noted that he believed that the
SEC could have won an extension of Dirks so the insider trading laws would apply to issuers,
but that litigation might have imposed too many costs and would have caused a chilling effect on
corporate communications. Lecture: Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD (Feb. 12,
2001), in 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 273, 279–81 (2001).
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necessarily precede it. In other words, enforcement should be limited
to rules-based enforcement. But why is that necessarily so? The
securities industry is governed not only by specific rules directed at
specific conduct but general principles embodied in statutes and case
42
law that are potentially applicable to a wide array of behavior.
Discussion of enforcement must also include principles-based
enforcement.
The law has long recognized the difference between rules, which
43
are promulgated ex ante, and principles, which are defined ex post.
The distinction between rules and principles inherent in the securities
regulatory regime was recognized as early as 1947 by the United
States Supreme Court in its seminal administrative law decision, SEC
v. Chenery Corp.44 In that case, the Supreme Court reviewed an SEC
order relating to the reorganization of a public utility holding
company. The SEC had taken the position that officers and directors
of the company could not purchase preferred stock in the company
during its reorganization to maintain management’s control. The SEC
“felt that the officers and directors of a holding company in process of
reorganization under the Act were fiduciaries and were under a duty
not to trade in the securities of that company during the
reorganization period.”45 The SEC’s original basis for its conclusion
was that court cases imposed such a duty. But the Supreme Court
disagreed, finding that neither the courts nor the SEC itself had
imposed such a rule, and remanded the case.46

42. An example of a principle is the general prohibition against “manipulative or deceptive
devices” and fraud set forth in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5. These provisions are intentionally broad and were described as “a ‘catchall’ clause to
enable the Commission ‘to deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.’” Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (quoting a statement of Thomas Corcoran in a hearing
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
43. The law review literature often refers to the distinction between rules and standards.
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559
(1992) (“Arguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly emphasize the
distinction between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961 (1995) (“[W]e have a rule, or rule-ness, to the
extent that decisions about cases have been made ex ante rather than ex post.”). When I use the
word principles, I am essentially referring to standards. I use the word principles because much
of the literature specific to the securities regulation refers to a distinction between rules and
principles rather than rules and standards. See supra note 1.
44. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
45. Id. at 197.
46. Id. at 198.
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On remand, the SEC issued a new order, coming to the same
result but articulating a new reason, “that the proposed transaction is
inconsistent with the standards of sections 7 and 11 of the [Public
47
Utility Holding Company] Act.” In other words, the transaction
violated a principle embodied in a statute. On appeal, management
argued that the SEC did not have the power to apply what was
essentially a new principle retroactively. They claimed that “the
Commission would be free only to promulgate a general rule
outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a rule
would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect
upon the instant situation.”48
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It reasoned that
although the SEC had the power to proceed by rulemaking, and
should do so in most instances, to accept the management’s position
49
would “stultify the administrative process.” It established that the
SEC could implement legal norms not only through the rulemaking
process, but also through principles-based enforcement, explaining:
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a
statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general
rule. Some principles must await their own development, while
others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable
situations. . . . [A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act
50
either by general rule or by individual order.

The Chenery Court observed that the choice of policymaking
form was not dictated by any legal standard, but was largely within
51
the discretion of the administrative agency. Although Chenery
involved an agency adjudication, its reasoning that the SEC has wide
discretion in the way it chooses to communicate legal norms applies
equally to enforcement actions.
Thus, there are two possible regulatory responses to arguable
misconduct—rulemaking and principles-based enforcement. Part II
tells the story of the reemergence of the latter approach.

47. Id. at 199.
48. Id. at 199–200.
49. Id. at 202.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 203 (“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency.”).
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II. THE RESURGENCE OF PRINCIPLES-BASED ENFORCEMENT
Just a few years after Regulation FD was passed, the securities
industry faced major enforcement actions in three areas:
(1) kickbacks in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocation process,
(2) conflicts of interests affecting Wall Street research analysts, and
52
(3) mutual funds that profited from market timing arrangements. All
three involved examples of what I describe as arguable misconduct,
instances in which the conduct was largely unregulated by rules but
violated a broader principle. The prior ideal, in which rulemaking

52. See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN.
L. REV. 757, 766 (2005) (“The [SEC] Enforcement Division has filed an unprecedented number
of actions, especially against organizations, in the last two years.”). In addition, the enforcement
response to the corporate scandals that erupted in the early part of this century has included
criminal prosecutions, private class actions, and civil regulatory enforcement actions.
Prosecutors have won criminal convictions against high level executives of bankrupt companies
who committed accounting fraud. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller et al., Symbol of an Era: Lay,
Skilling are Convicted of Fraud—Jurors Reject Defense Claim That Enron Was Clean; Question
of Credibility—Two ‘Very Controlling People,’ WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1; Barry Meier, 2
Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at A1; Dionne Searcey et al., Ebbers
is Sentenced to 25 Years for $11 Billion WorldCom Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2005 at A1. Class
action plaintiffs have brought numerous suits and negotiated billions of dollars in settlements
against the gatekeepers who should have detected such fraud. See, e.g., Robin Sidel, J.P.
Morgan to Pay $2 Billion As Street’s Bill for Bubble Soars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at A1;
Randall Smith & Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Agrees To Settle IPO Case for $425 Million, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 21, 2006, at C4; Jonathan Weil & Robin Sidel, WorldCom Investors Settle Lawsuits—
Investment Banks Will Pay Almost All of $651 Million in Pact Tied to Bond Deals, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 27, 2005, at A3.
While all three responses have had success, I would argue that civil regulatory
enforcement actions have been the most instrumental in communicating legal norms to industry.
Criminal law is limited by its stringent burden of proof and the collateral effects of corporate
indictments. See, e.g., Ken Brown et al., Called to Account: Indictment of Andersen in Shredding
Case Puts Its Future in Question—Obstruction of Justice Count May Speed the Departure of
Clients and Partners—Firm Calls It ‘Death Penalty,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at A1. Private
class actions focus on private interests and terms of settlements are often classified. See, e.g.,
Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1000 (1994) (“Although private claims
play an undeniably important role in the enforcement of the securities laws, they are brought for
entirely private ends. Private damages actions focus narrowly on how much the individual lost
as a result of the illegal conduct and whether that injury can be reasonably quantified.” (quoting
SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993))). Because of their civil nature, enforcement
actions do not suffer from the restrictions of criminal prosecutions. Because they are brought by
government officials serving the public interest, they do not suffer from the same limits as
private class actions. Through the use of subpoena power, the government can obtain evidence
and craft complaints that are based on more than conjecture. The allegations can be widely
publicized so that the precise evidence of wrongdoing and why it was wrong is communicated to
the public. By doing so, the application of the legal norm can be communicated to industry with
great speed.
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preceded rules-based enforcement actions, was reversed in all three
cases, in which principles-based enforcement actions preceded
rulemaking.
A. The IPO Cases
The first example is the action by the SEC and NASD against
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) for abuses related to its allocation
53
of IPO shares to brokerage customers. CSFB entered into quid pro
quo arrangements with its customers where: (1) CSFB would provide
a customer with shares in an IPO likely to immediately increase
exponentially in price; and (2) the customer would funnel back a
portion of its abnormally high IPO profits to CSFB by paying
abnormally high rates for executing unrelated securities transactions.54
1. The Market for “Hot IPOs.” In an IPO, a company issues
shares to the public for the first time.55 Typically, an investment bank
will underwrite the deal, purchasing the shares from the issuer at a
56
discount (usually 7 percent) and reselling the shares to the public.
The underwriter advises the issuer regarding marketing the IPO to
investors and setting the initial price at which the IPO shares will be
sold.57 Many underwriters have brokerage divisions that execute

53. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 1–2; see also SEC Sues CSFB for IPO
Violations; CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, SEC Litigation Release No. 17327 (Jan. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17327.htm (discussing abuses relating to
the allocation of IPO shares to brokerage customers).
54. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 1–2.
55. Id. at para. 8.
56. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential
Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 590–92 (2004).
Typically, there is more than one investment bank involved in the deal. Most IPOs are
“offered to the public through an ‘underwriting syndicate,’ a group of underwriters who agree to
purchase the shares from the issuer and then sell the shares to investors.” SEC, Initial Public
Offerings: Why Individuals Have Difficulty Getting Shares, Nov. 24, 1999, http://www.sec.
gov/answers/ipodiff.htm [hereinafter SEC, Initial Public Offerings]; see also Billing v. Credit
Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the risk management
function of forming underwriting syndicates as well as syndicates’ prominence), rev’d on other
grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007) .
57. See
generally
NYSE/NASD IPO
ADVISORY
COMM.,
REPORT
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4–5 (2003) (“We encourage underwriters to engage in an open discussion
with the issuer’s pricing committee, explaining to the issuer the context and significance of
indications of interest from various investors, as well as sharing their perspective on this
demand.”).
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equity transactions through which they can allocate the IPO shares.
Investors who receive allocations of IPO shares have the right to
purchase the IPO shares at the initial offering price.
When the demand for shares of an issuer is significantly greater
than the supply, investors may be willing to pay substantially more for
an IPO share than its initial price.59 Thus, the price of these shares can
quickly rise.60 Investors who receive IPO allocations and purchase the
stock at the initial offering price can make a substantial profit by
61
immediately selling those shares in the secondary market. IPOs that
immediately trade at a premium in the secondary market are known
as “hot IPOs.”62 The late 1990s saw one of the most fervent “hot IPO”
63
markets, especially with respect to IPOs by internet companies.
Investment banks allocate the bulk of IPO shares to large
64
institutional clients such as mutual funds and hedge funds. Retail
customers such as smaller institutions and individual investors find it
more difficult to receive allocations because the main criteria for
allocating IPO shares to investors is the amount of business the

58. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 11.
59. Studies show that this commonly occurs. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241
F. Supp. 2d at 300 (“For at least five decades, studies have shown that IPOs generally trade on
the open market at a price significantly higher than the offering price, a phenomenon known as
underpricing.”).
60. John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Investigations: Who’s the Victim? What’s the Harm?,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/crying/coffeeipos.html (last visited Nov.
27, 2007) (“[P]rice spikes occur because the offering is oversubscribed—that is, the underwriters
have solicited ‘indications of interest’ from potential buyers amounting to many times the
number of shares that the issuer . . . wishes to sell.”).
61. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 294; CSFB Complaint,
supra note 16, at para. 17.
62. See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 139 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d
on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007); CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 8; SEC, Initial
Public Offerings, supra note 56 (“When an IPO is ‘hot,’ appealing to many investors, the
demand for the securities far exceeds the supply of shares. The excess demand can only be
satisfied once trading in the IPO shares begins.”).
63. See generally In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (“[T]he IPO
market of 1998–2000 was more extraordinary than the previous three hot issues markets.”);
NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., supra note 57, at 1, 4 (noting that the late 1990s was “a
period in which an unusually large number of offerings traded at extraordinary and immediate
aftermarket premiums”). IPO shares would frequently double or triple in price on the first day
of trading. For example, shares of the company VA Linux rose from an initial offering price of
$30 to $239 in the first day of trading, an increase of 697 percent. See CSFB Complaint, supra
note 16, at para. 54. Of course, there is no guarantee that over time the initial rise in price is
sustainable. See, e.g., Howard Schilit, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS 104–08 (2d ed. 2002)
(describing collapse of Boston Chicken stock after a successful IPO).
64. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 15.
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investor conducts with the brokerage division of the investment
65
bank. Broker-dealers earn much of their revenue by charging a
commission for executing securities transactions. Typically, for
institutions, the commission rate for an equity transaction is $0.06 per
share.66 Large institutions managing billions of dollars have the ability
to generate more for the broker-dealers in commissions from
securities transactions than do individual investors with small
portfolios.67
2. The Enforcement Action against Credit Suisse First Boston.
In 1999, CSFB managed more domestic IPOs than any other U.S.
investment bank.68 As a result, it had access to a large number of “hot
IPOs” that it allocated to favored customers. CSFB entered into
explicit arrangements with certain customers allowing it to capture a
part of the “hot IPO” profits.69 In return for allocations in a “hot
IPO,” the customer would agree to funnel back as much as 65 percent
70
of its IPO profits to CSFB. Customers repaid IPO profits by
generating commissions on unrelated securities transactions.71 On the
days around an IPO, the customer would buy highly liquid securities,
such as shares in IBM or Procter & Gamble, through CSFB’s
brokerage division. Instead of paying the normal $0.06 per share
commission on these transactions, the customer would pay
commissions as high as $3.15 per share on the transaction. The
65. Id. at para. 13; see also Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the Los Angeles
Times Fourth Annual Investment Strategies Conference: Investing with Your Eyes Open (Feb.
12, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch345.htm (“Shares often are allocated
according to business relationships and other subjective criteria.”).
66. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 46. This commission covers the cost of
execution and the value of advice and other services such as research provided by the brokerdealer.
67. Coffee, supra note 60 (“[L]arge institutional investors implicitly pay for receiving
priority in the allocation of ‘hot’ offerings by directing their brokerage business to the major
underwriters. . . . [A large mutual fund] could direct this brokerage business to a cheap discount
broker, or it could negotiate a somewhat higher commission rate with a broker dealer that was
also a major underwriter in return for a priority in the latter’s IPO allocations.”); see also
Jonathan Reuter, Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds, 61 J. OF FIN.
2289, 2290, 2322 (2006) (finding that underwriters allocate based on amount of overall
“brokerage business”).
68. News Release, NASD Regulation, Inc., Statement of Mary Schapiro on Announcement
of CSFB Action (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/
2002NewsReleases/P002966.
69. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 19–20.
70. Id. at paras. 42–43.
71. Id. at paras. 21–22.
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customer would then sell the securities through another broker72
dealer, paying the normal $0.06 per share commission.
The scheme involved entities too small to generate the
73
commission business needed to receive an IPO allocation. Thus,
most of the customers paid the commissions willingly, because while
they had to return a portion of their profits, they still earned a
substantial profit on the transaction.74
In December 2000, after reports in the Wall Street Journal noted
unusual commission activity on the days before and after many IPOs,
75
regulators began investigating CSFB’s IPO allocation practices. On
January 22, 2002, the SEC and NASD announced a settlement with
76
CSFB. The primary substantive count alleged was a violation of
NASD Rule 2330(f), which prohibits brokers from sharing in the
77
profits of their customers. CSFB’s conduct was also alleged to
violate NASD Rule 2110, which requires brokers to comport with
high standards of commercial honor, a standard charge in NASD
actions.78 CSFB agreed to pay $70 million in disgorgement, pay a $30
million penalty, implement policies and procedures governing IPO

72. Id. at para. 22.
73. Id. at para. 2.
74. Id. at para. 20.
75. See Susan Pulliam et al., Coming to Terms: CSFB Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Settle
Twin IPO Investigations—Probes by SEC and NASD Grew out of Conduct During Dot-Com
Frenzy—A Legacy of Wheat’s Reign, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A1 (“Investigators began
focusing last year on CSFB’s alleged practice of awarding shares of hot IPOs to some investors
who agreed to pay the firm large commissions on other transactions. As detailed in a series of
Wall Street Journal stories beginning in December 2000, some of these commissions came on
big batches of trades at hugely inflated rates.”).
76. SEC Sues CSFB for IPO Violations; CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, supra note 53; News
Release, NASD Regulation, Inc., supra note 68.
77. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 74–75. NASD Rule 2330(f) provides in
relevant part:
[N]o member or person associated with a member shall share directly or indirectly in
the profits or losses in any account of a customer carried by the member or any other
member; provided, however, that a member or person associated with a member may
share in the profits or losses in such an account if (i) such person associated with a
member obtains prior written authorization from the member employing the
associated person; (ii) such member or person associated with a member obtains prior
written authorization from the customer; and (iii) such member or person associated
with a member shares in the profits or losses in any account of such customer only in
direct proportion to the financial contributions made to such account by either the
member or person associated with a member.
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2330(f)(1)(A),
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
78. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 70–72.
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allocations, and hire an independent consultant to monitor its
79
compliance with the settlement.
3. Lack of Regulation. The CSFB IPO case broke new ground.
Prior to the CSFB case, the SEC’s position was that underwriters
could allocate IPO shares however they wanted to their customers.80
As it had explained to investors in a release: “The underwriters and
the company that issues the shares control the IPO process. They
have wide latitude in allocating IPO shares. The SEC does not
81
regulate the business decision of how IPO shares are allocated.” The
SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, approved of allocating “hot IPOs” to
customers who generated the most commission business, calling it a
“good business practice, in the same way that an automobile dealer
will allocate the first new, highly desired car to a customer that had
been with them for a period of time.”82 The SEC and NASD had
investigated the practice of allocating “hot IPO” shares to top
83
executives in 1997 but brought no action.
The SEC’s citation of NASD Rule 2330(f) in the CSFB case was
84
not the simple application of a rule. As reported by the Wall Street
79. See SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., No. 1: 02-00090-RWR, 2002 WL 479836,
at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2002).
80. NASD rules prohibit underwriters from allocating IPO shares to themselves, relatives,
or to accounts where they have a “beneficial interest.” Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD
Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2790, http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007).
81. SEC, Initial Public Offerings, supra note 56; see also John C. Coffee, The SEC’s IPO
Probe, NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2001, at B8 (“No duty to prorate IPO stock among all customers, or to
otherwise apportion it ‘fairly’ has ever been recognized within the industry.”); SEC, Allocation
of New Issues of Securities, 1994 WL 744595, at *1 (Oct. 18, 1994) (“Broker-dealers are free to
establish their own procedures and priorities for allocating new shares to investors, as long as
the allocation is not conducted in a fraudulent or manipulative manner and is consistent with
the rules of the broker-dealers’ self-regulatory organization (SRO). . . . None of the SROs,
however, prescribe procedures that broker-dealers must use to allocate offering securities
among their customers.”).
82. Interview by Martin Smith with Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, SEC (May 2001),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/interviews/levitt.html; see
also Levitt, supra note 65 (“Shares often are allocated according to business relationships and
other subjective criteria.”).
83. See Randall Smith, NASD Proposes Tougher Rules on IPO Abuses—Agency Would
Bar Brokers from Allocating Hot Issues To Curry Favor with Clients, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2002,
at A1 (“Although both the SEC and NASD investigated spinning [in response to a 1997 Wall
Street Journal article], neither agency brought a case against any major firm.”).
84. NASD Rule 2330(f) provides: “Except as provided in paragraph (f)(2) no member or
person associated with a member shall share directly or indirectly in the profits or losses in any
account of a customer carried by the member or any other member . . . .” Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
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Journal, there was internal dissension among regulators about what
85
rule to apply. NASD Rule 2330(f) had not been understood as
regulating IPO allocation decisions. Although CSFB’s conduct fell
within NASD Rule 2330(f) in a literal sense in that CSFB was
requiring customers to share their guaranteed IPO profits by
returning part of the profits through excessive commissions, it did not
fall within the original purpose of that rule, which was to protect
retail customers from conflicts of interest that could arise when
brokers had an interest in their investments.86 In contrast, unlike the
typical NASD Rule 2330(f) case, CSFB involved sophisticated
customers who knew exactly what they were doing. Even with the
requirement to pay back a portion of the profits, they knew they
87
would receive a substantial return with little or no risk.
4. The Commercial Bribery Principle. A more convincing
theory is that CSFB’s quid pro quo arrangements with its customers
violated a principle against commercial bribery,88 which reflects the

Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2330(f)(1)(A), http://finra.complinet.
com/finra/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
85. See Pulliam et al., supra note 75 (“In the CSFB case, the regulators have struggled with
what law to apply to the firm’s practices.”).
Early speculation had been that the conduct could violate other rules such as the Freeriding and Withholding Rules or bans against undisclosed underwriting compensation. See
Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Two at CSFB Put on Leave amid IPO Probe—Action Shows
Inquiry Touches Tech Team of Frank Quattrone, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at C1.
86. NASD Rule 2330(f) was modeled after section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act,
which also prohibits certain profit sharing arrangements. See NASD Notice to Members 01-24:
SEC Approves Proposed Rule Changes to Rule 2330(f)(2) Relating to Performance Fees (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/
p003885.pdf. The legislative history of Section 205 indicates that the rationale for the
prohibition against profit sharing was the concern that customers would be harmed if advisers
had an incentive to make risky investments in hopes of a larger fee. See Exemption To Allow
Registered Investment Advisors to Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of Capital Gains Upon or
Capital Appreciation of a Client’s Account, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,556, 48,557 (Nov. 26, 1985)
(“Congress enacted the prohibition of Section 205(1) against performance fees in 1940 to
protect clients of investment advisers from fee arrangements which in Congress’ view could
encourage advisers to engage in speculative trading practices while managing client funds in
order to realize or increase an advisory fee.”).
87. See Coffee, supra note 81.
88. See The Impact of the Global Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 44 (2003) (statement of Robert E. Glauber, Chairman
and CEO, National Association of Securities Dealers) (describing enforcement actions as
underscoring the principle “that hot IPOs cannot be doled out to corporate insiders as virtual
commercial bribes”).

02__PARK.DOC

2007]

12/20/2007 10:10:17 AM

SECURITIES REGULATION

649
89

public importance of markets that function without kickbacks. By
paying commission rates greater than the market price, CSFB’s
customers were essentially paying kickbacks or commercial bribes in
return for IPO allocations. In another sense, CSFB was bribing its
customers through IPO allocations to pay greater than market prices
for its brokerage services. Although commercial bribery is not
specifically prohibited by NASD Rules, NASD Rule 2110 sets forth a
general principle that broker-dealers are required to “observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade” in the “conduct of [their] business.”90 Given that commercial
bribery is widely prohibited by other statutes,91 it follows that bribery
would violate “high standards of commercial honor and just and
equitable principles of trade.”
One objection to this theory is that there is no substantial
difference between a smaller customer paying above-market
commissions to obtain IPO allocations and larger customers obtaining
IPO allocations by directing a large volume of trades at market prices.
92
Both are attempting to pay something to get something. But the
quid pro quo agreements found in the investigation of CSFB made it
clear that the allocations were not based on the status of the customer
but instead were part of an explicit kickback arrangement. Moreover,
the excessive commissions paid by CSFB customers did not reflect the
purchase of legitimate services. Under Section 28(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act, an investment manager may lawfully pay a
commission higher than the market commission rate only “if such
person determined in good faith that such amount of commission was
reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research
services provided.”93 The commissions in the CSFB case were so

89. See generally 12 AM. JUR. 2D Bribery § 1 (2007) (“[B]ribery is the criminal offense of
offering, giving, soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept something of value with an intent to
corruptly influence the action of . . . an employee of a private business . . . . The purpose of
bribery is to cause certain matters that should be decided or handled in an objective way to be
decided or handled in the private interest of the bribegiver or the bribetaker. It is something
that directly affects the community at large. It offends the public sense of decency and tends to
pervert justice.” (footnotes omitted)).
90. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2110,
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
91. See generally D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes
Punishing Commercial Bribery, 1 A.L.R.3d 1350 (1965) (collecting state and federal commercial
bribery statutes).
92. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 81.
93. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).
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excessive that they could not have been for legitimate brokerage and
94
research services.
In essence, the CSFB case established that allocations of “hot
IPO” shares should not be used as commercial bribes. This general
principle was then extended to question a number of different IPO
95
allocation practices through rulemaking and enforcement. After the
CSFB case, practices such as “spinning,” in which “hot IPO” shares
were allocated to company officers and directors in exchange for
96
investment banking business, and “laddering,” in which “hot IPO”
shares were allocated in exchange for an agreement to purchase
additional shares of the IPO in the aftermarket, were closely
97
scrutinized. For example, the New York Attorney General brought
suit against directors of WorldCom for their involvement in
94. Indeed, the typical market commission of $0.06 per share already includes an extra
payment for research and other services. Thus, payments of $1.00 per share go far beyond the
industry standard for a reasonable commission.
95. On July 25, 2002, the NASD proposed conduct rules regulating IPO abuses. News
Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Board Approves Proposed Conduct Rules for IPO
Activities (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002News
Releases/P002921. It proposed explicitly prohibiting the quid pro quo arrangements at issue in
the CSFB case as well as “spinning” and “laddering.” Id. In August 2002, at the request of the
SEC Commissioner, the NYSE and NASD formed the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee
to study the IPO process. See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., supra note 57, at app. A.
In May 2003, the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee published its report, recommending
various measures to improve the transparency of the IPO process, including the prohibition of
laddering, spinning, and quid pro quo arrangements. Id. at 10–13.
In addition to these structural reform proposals, the CSFB investigation was followed by
a number of enforcement actions against other market participants. See, e.g., SEC Sues J.P.
Morgan Securities Inc. for Unlawful IPO Allocation Practices; J.P. Morgan Agrees to
Settlement Calling for Injunction and Payment of $25 Million Penalty, SEC Litigation Release
No. 18385 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18385.htm; SEC
Sues Robertson Stephens, Inc. for Profit Sharing in Connection with Initial Public Offerings;
Robertson Stephens Consents to Pay $28 Million, SEC Litigation Release No. 17923 (Jan. 9,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17923.htm; News Release, Nat’l
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Fines J.P. Morgan for Sharing in Profits from Hot IPOs (Feb. 20,
2003), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2003NewsReleases/P002951;
News Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Sanctions Investment Banks for IPO
Violations: Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley to Pay Over $15 Million (May 18,
2004), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2004NewsReleases/P002829.
96. Cf. Griffith, supra note 56, at 623–30, 637–43 (discussing the hypothesis that spinning
“may amount to a quid pro quo arrangement, according to which the managers accept the
benefit of the allocation in exchange for the underpricing of their company’s offering”).
97. See, e.g., Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“The purported ‘bribes’ consisted of underwriter promises to make ‘exceptionally large’
allocations of IPO securities in return for the institutional defendants’ promises to comply with
the rules set by the underwriter defendants for the resale of the securities and to divide profits
with them.”), rev’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
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“spinning.” In February 2006, a New York state court ruled that
98
“spinning” was “merely a somewhat sophisticated form of bribery.”
Through the CSFB case, securities regulators asserted a principle
against commercial bribery that was extended to other practices.
B. The Research Analyst Cases
A second example is the enforcement action initiated by the New
York Attorney General targeting the practices of Wall Street
research analysts. To win investment banking business, research
analysts knowingly issued false opinions in their research reports and
recommendations. The investigation of these practices established
that these research recommendations were violating the anti-fraud
principle.
1. The Merging of Research and Investment Banking. Research
analysts grade public companies. They analyze the financials of a
company, speak to management, interview customers, and form an
opinion about the company’s future prospects.99 This opinion is often
expressed through a scale of recommendations to buy, hold, or sell
the stock.100 These opinions, predictions, and their bases are published
in research reports that are distributed to investors and can influence
101
the price of a stock.
Most investment banks do not directly charge for research. Part
of the commission clients pay for execution of equity transactions is
102
As competition among
understood as paying for research.
brokerage firms increased, commission rates went down and the
revenue generated by analysts declined. As a result, research analysts
began serving the needs of investment bankers because of their
103
inability to generate revenue independently. At the same time, the

98. State of New York v. McLeod, No. 403855/02, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1227, at *2 (Sup.
Ct. Feb. 9, 2006).
99. See, e.g., Complaint at paras. 15–17, SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. 03 Civ. 2939,
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003); SEC, Investor Alert: Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, Apr. 20,
2005, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm.
100. See SEC, supra note 99.
101. See id.
102. This is permissible under section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).
103. See Complaint at para. 18, SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 03 CV
2941 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003); Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal
Usurption of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin
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investment banking business became much more competitive as the
dominance of a few elite firms offering investment banking services
104
waned. Competition became especially intense to be the lead
underwriter who runs the securities offering, receives the greatest
105
portion of fees, and is in charge of allocating IPO shares.
To distinguish themselves from their competitors, investment
banks began using research coverage to obtain underwriting business.
A credible research analyst might be an attractive reason for an issuer
106
to choose the investment bank as lead underwriter. A favorable
report by a research analyst gives credibility to a new company that is

Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 971 (2005) (“In response to complaints that brokerage
commissions had sunk so low that brokers could no longer afford to pay analysts, analysts
became more involved in marketing IPOs in order to justify their retention by investment
banks.”).
104. See DAN REINGOLD, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL STREET ANALYST 36 (2006). Reingold
describes
the end of the genteel old world of banking, in which belonging to the same country
club and living in the same town was as much of a draw for a corporate executive
choosing a banker as the actual services the bank was offering. As banking became
more competitive, these relationships weren’t enough anymore. Banks needed to
offer something extra, some special sauce. As time went on, that special sauce would
often involve bullish research.
Id.
105. See, e.g., Complaint at para. 17, SEC v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc., 03 Civ. 2942
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. Bancorp Complaint]; Complaint at para. 15, SEC v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 03 Civ. 2948, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley
Complaint] (“Morgan Stanley typically competed with other investment banks for selection as
the lead underwriter, or ‘bookrunner,’ for securities offerings, including IPOs and follow-on
offerings. . . . Sole or joint bookrunners generally received the largest portion of underwriting
fees, which were typically divided among the participating investment banks. The bookrunner
also established the allocation of shares in an offering and typically retained the greatest
number of shares for itself. The typical IPO generated millions of dollars in investment banking
fees for the bookrunner.”).
106. See Morgan Stanley Complaint, supra note 105, at para. 16 (“In selecting the lead
underwriters, issuers assessed a host of factors, including the strength and quality of the
bankers’ research coverage. Issuers sought research coverage of their stocks, believing such
coverage would enhance the credibility of their businesses, potentially lead to higher stock
prices, and increase their exposure to the investing public.”); REINGOLD, supra note 104, at 75
(“[A] bank’s research analyst was beginning to be one of the most important factors
determining which investment banks companies and countries chose to handle their deals.”); Jill
E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the Research Analyst, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 58, 63–64 (“In the late 1990s, Wall Street research analysts were
powerful and influential. . . . The ability of an investment bank’s research department to
influence investor sentiment was a key factor in the bank’s ability to attract underwriting
business.”).
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entering the public markets for the first time and could increase the
107
initial price at which its stock trades.
2. The New York Attorney General’s Investigation of Merrill
Lynch. In June 2001, the New York Attorney General began an
investigation of all stock recommendations made by Merrill Lynch
108
internet research analysts. On April 8, 2002, a New York state court
granted the New York Attorney General’s motion for a preliminary
injunction against Merrill Lynch.109 The motion contained e-mail
evidence that Merrill Lynch research analysts had secretly denigrated
stocks they recommended to the public.
In essence, the motion alleged that analysts publicly
recommended stocks while privately expressing negative opinions
110
about those stocks. They did so because they were pressured by
111
investment bankers and issuers to alter their reports. There was
pressure because Merrill Lynch used the implicit promise of favorable
ratings from a high-profile analyst to obtain investment banking
business.112 Research analysts were motivated to give in because their
compensation depended upon the amount of investment banking
revenue they helped bring in.113
The New York Attorney General’s action alleged violations of
New York’s securities anti-fraud statute, the Martin Act.114 In May
2002, Merrill Lynch agreed to settle the case for a $100 million fine

107. Interview by Martin Smith with Arthur Levitt, supra note 82 (“When fixed
commissions were eliminated [in 1975], more and more of Wall Street’s profits had to come
from investment banking. But what is the very best way to get investment banking business?
The language of Wall Street is, ‘We’ll get you coverage.’ And what kind of coverage does that
mean? An overwhelming number of research reports written about investment banking clients
are favorable.”).
108. See Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 2.
109. See In re Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002)
(order granting a preliminary injunction).
110. See Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 13 (detailing in a chart instances in which public
rating diverged from private comments).
111. See id. at 17, 20–23 (“Investment banking also was involved in criticizing and editing
the internet group’s reports for client companies, opining on whether a particular rating would
be acceptable and, in at least one instance, apparently opposing a proposed rating.”).
112. See id. at 15–17.
113. See id. at 20–21.
114. See Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 et seq. (McKinney 2006); Affidavit of Eric
R. Dinallo, supra note 16, at 35–37.
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and take steps to better manage the relationship between investment
115
banking and research.
3. Lack of Regulation. Prior to the New York Attorney
General’s action, it was widely known among sophisticated investors
that investment banks were using research analysts to generate
116
investment banking business. As early as 1996, academic studies and
the media noted that this was a conflict of interest that led to biased
reports.117 Yet regulators did little to address the problems. There
were no SEC, NASD, or NYSE rules directly regulating the
118
relationship between investment bankers and research analysts. As
the SEC chief of enforcement commented in a Wall Street Journal
article on conflicts of interest relating to research analysts in 1997,
“There are no hard and fast federal laws that say you can do this and
you can’t do this . . . . It really is a question of navigating the problem
case by case.”119 Moreover, an SEC no-action letter in 1997 allowed
Merrill Lynch’s research analysts to comment on deals in which
Merrill Lynch was the investment banker,120 implicitly legitimizing the
interaction between research and banking.

115. See Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch to Pay Big Fine, Increase Oversight of Analysts—
New York Attorney General Wins $100 Million Penalty; E-mails Exposed Research, WALL ST. J.,
May 22, 2002, at A1.
116. See Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked, Shocked: The “Discovery” of Analyst
Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 89, 91 (2004) (“[T]he basic facts ‘discovered’ by
Eliot Spitzer, by other regulators, and ultimately by the plaintiffs’ bar after the collapse of the
Internet bubble were actually well known to sophisticated market participants throughout the
1990s.”). Indeed as early as 1992, the Wall Street Journal published an article describing one
investment bank’s policy that research analysts not make negative comments about investment
banking clients. See Michael Siconolfi, At Morgan Stanley, Analysts Were Urged to Soften Harsh
Views, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at A1.
117. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351,
383–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (collecting examples of news stories describing analyst conflicts of
interest); Wall Street Has an Unlikely New Cop: Spitzer—State Office, Used to Policing Junk
Mail, Finds Fertile Ground in Stock Research, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at C1 (“For years,
newspaper articles have detailed how Wall Street firms provided overly optimistic research
about companies that were investment banking clients, he noted, but there was no serious effort
by regulators to address this issue.”).
118. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775,
790 (2006) (“For various reasons, courts and commentators were hostile to SEC regulation of
securities analysts, who remained relatively unregulated until recently.”).
119. Anita Raghavan, Jack of All Trades: How One Top Analyst Vaults ‘Chinese Wall’ To
Do Deals for Firm—For Salomon, Grubman is Big Telecom Rainmaker; Investors Heed Him,
Too—A Role That’s Hard to Police, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1997, at A1.
120. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 1014, at *4 (Oct. 21, 1997).
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The sentiment may have been that the problem could be solved
through rulemaking. In 1999, two years before the New York
Attorney General’s suit, the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation
began reviewing the research analyst industry for conflicts of
121
interest. In testimony before Congress in 2001, almost a year before
the Attorney General filed suit, the acting SEC Chairman reported
with respect to the results of this review: “I recently called on the
industry to take an active role in dealing with these and other
problems surrounding analysts’ conflicts of interest. . . . [T]he
industry, as well as the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have
heard this call to action.”122 The SEC initiated rulemaking on the
issue.123
4. The Anti-Fraud Principle. Rather than deferring to the
SEC’s rulemaking approach for managing conflicts of interest, the
New York Attorney General issued subpoenas and initiated an
investigation of research analyst practices. That investigation
uncovered evidence of specific fraud by a high-profile research
analyst at a premier firm.124
In essence, fraud is a knowing misrepresentation made to induce
action by an individual who suffers harm as a result of relying on that
125
misrepresentation. The evidence uncovered by the New York

121. Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Speech to
the Fin. Women’s Ass’n: Analysts Conflicts of Interest: Taking Steps to Remove Bias (May 8,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch559.htm.
122. Analyzing the Analysts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 228,
229 (2001) (written statement of Laura S. Unger, acting chair, SEC).
123. See Gasperino & Schroeder, supra note 13 (“The SEC chairman believed that the
solution to the problem was developing a new set of national standards for analysts, while at the
same time directing self-regulatory organizations, such as the National Association of Securities
Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange, to examine conflicts of interest and draw up new
rules on analyst compensation and disclosure practices.”).
124. See Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 36.
125. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). The New York
Attorney General investigates and prosecutes fraud based on a broadly worded New York State
statute called the Martin Act. Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW, § 352 et seq. (McKinney 2006).
While the Martin Act is a broad statute, it basically covers the same type of fraud prohibited by
the federal securities laws. However, there are differences between the two statutory regimes.
Federal securities law requires the showing of scienter or proof that the misrepresentation was
made knowingly. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). In contrast, the
Martin Act does not require such a showing. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E.
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Attorney General left little doubt that at least some research analysts
were knowingly making misrepresentations to the public. Analysts
made positive comments about companies in their research reports,
recommending that the public buy stock in the companies, while
secretly recognizing that the stocks they were recommending were of
poor quality. Even general statements of belief can be actionable as
126
fraudulent if they are known to be false. Because research reports
are widely disseminated to the public, and used by investment
advisers to recommend stocks to investors, the analyst
recommendations were made with the purpose of inducing reliance.
As a result of their reliance on false recommendations, investors who
purchased stock in companies that later declined substantially in
value were damaged.
This clear violation of the basic anti-fraud principle in a highprofile case trumped the lack of precise rules governing research
analysts. The result was a remarkable and monumental shift in the
relationship between investment bankers and research analysts. The
SEC followed the New York Attorney General’s lead and brought
principles-based enforcement actions against Merrill Lynch and other
companies.127 The Merrill Lynch case also led regulators to
promulgate rules regulating the relationship between research
128
analysts and investment bankers. Ultimately, it resulted in the
separation of investment banking and research among major Wall

655, 658 (N.Y. 1926). In the Merrill Lynch case, while the case was brought under the broader
state statute, it appears the scienter requirement was met.
The Martin Act was enacted by the New York State Legislature in 1921, giving the
Attorney General the power to investigate securities transactions and seek injunctive relief. Act
of May 7, 1921, 1921 N.Y. Laws 1989. In 1955, the New York State Legislature added section
352-c to the Martin Act, giving the Attorney General the power to seek criminal indictments in
securities fraud cases. Act of Apr. 21, 1955, 1955 N.Y. Laws 1255.
126. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991).
127. E.g., SEC v. Merrill Lynch & Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 18083, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1742 (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lr18038.htm.
128. On May 8, 2002, the SEC approved rules proposed in February 2002 by the NASD
meant to regulate the relationship between research and investment banking. News Release,
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Statement of NASD Chairmen and CEO Robert R. Glauber
Regarding SEC Approval of New Analyst Rules (May 8, 2002), available at http://www.
finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/P002935. On October 3, 2002, the
NYSE and NASD proposed additional rules relating to research analysts and the formation of a
committee to investigate practices relating to IPOs. See News Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers and N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE, NASD Move to Strengthen Rules Concerning Analysts,
IPOs Both Efforts In Support of Joint Effort with SEC, NY Attorney General (Oct. 3, 2002),
available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/P002895.
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as well as the payment of a record settlement of $1.4

C. The Mutual Fund Cases
The final example is the New York Attorney General’s
investigation of the mutual fund industry. Mutual funds entered into
arrangements with hedge funds in which they exchanged the right to
“market time”—or to make frequent transactions that the mutual
fund otherwise prohibited because they reduced the value of the
fund—for the commitment by the hedge fund to generate a certain
amount of management fees by investing assets in a related mutual
fund. These arrangements violated fiduciary duty and anti-fraud
principles because mutual funds profited at the expense of investors
while publicly proclaiming that they prohibited such practices.
1. Mutual Funds. A mutual fund is a pool of investments such
as stocks or bonds managed by an expert. Investors who purchase
shares in the fund pay annual fees equal to a percentage of the assets
under management.131 The financial success of a mutual fund depends
129. On April 25, 2002, the SEC, NASD, NYSE and NASAA announced they were
commencing a joint investigation with the New York Attorney General directed at research
analysts. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst Conflicts (Apr.
25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56.htm.
130. On December 20, 2002, regulators announced a $1.4 billion global settlement in
principle with ten firms. See Press Release, SEC, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA,
NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices:
$1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm. On April 28, 2003, the regulators
announced the final settlement with those firms as well as additional factual findings. See Joint
Press Release, SEC et al., Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking: Historic Settlement
Requires Payments of Penalties of $487.5 Million, Disgorgement of $387.5 Million, Payments of
$432.5 Million to Fund Independent Research, and Payments of $80 Million to Fund Investor
Education and Mandates Sweeping Structural Reforms (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. The firms paid a total of $875 million in penalties and
disgorgement, $432.5 million to fund independent research, and $80 million to fund and
promote investor education. See id. The firms agreed to wide-ranging structural reform,
essentially separating research and investment banking. See SEC, SEC Fact Sheet on Global
Analyst Research Settlements, Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm.
131. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of
Conflicts of Interest, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 609, 614 (2001) (“Mutual funds historically have
provided their shareholders with the ability to pursue a vast array of different investment
objectives as co-owners of an entity offering three main services: diversified investment risk,
professional investment management, and a redeemable security.”); SEC, Invest Wisely: An
Introduction to Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Nov.
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132
on its ability to attract assets. With the market decline of the early
2000s, many mutual funds found the value of their assets shrinking as
the value of their investments declined and investors pulled their
133
money out of the stock market. Many mutual funds were forced to
look for other ways to attract assets. One source of assets was hedge
funds, which are investment vehicles limited to sophisticated
investors.

2. The New York Attorney General’s Investigation of Canary. In
2002, the New York Attorney General received a tip that a hedge
fund, Canary Capital Partners, LLC, had entered into secret
arrangements with mutual funds allowing it to profit at the expense of
other mutual fund investors.134 The Attorney General’s subsequent
investigation found that hedge funds were systematically taking
advantage of arbitrage opportunities arising from peculiarities in the
way that mutual funds are priced. In particular, they were engaging in
a practice called market timing,135 which involves the frequent

27, 2007); SEC, Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm (last visited Nov. 27,
2007).
In the 1990s, mutual funds experienced unprecedented growth as millions of individuals
began investing in securities in response to a rising stock market and the decline of traditional
pension plans. See Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking Out for Investors?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 174 (2003) (testimony of Stephen M. Cutler, Dir.,
Div. of Enforcement, SEC) (“With more than 95 million Americans invested in mutual funds,
representing approximately 54 million U.S. households, and a combined $7 trillion in assets,
mutual funds are a vital part of this nation’s economy and millions of investors’ financial
security.”); JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: AN
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 5 (2002) (reporting that mutual fund assets grew from $1.065 trillion
in 1990 to $6.965 trillion in 2000).
132. See Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the
Mutual Fund Industry 2 (July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240596 (“[T]he
revenues of mutual funds families are a function of assets under management.”).
133. See Brian Reid & Stefan Kimball, Mutual Fund Industry Developments in 2002, 9
INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. 1, 2–4 (2003) (describing outflow in mutual fund investments).
134. BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 135–41
(2006).
135. There were also allegations of “late trading,” which violated existing rules. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2007). This rule is referred to as the “forward pricing” rule. See Disclosure
Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, Securities Act
Release No. 8343, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,287, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402, 70,403
(proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (describing the rule as the “forward pricing” rule). In 1968, the SEC
passed this rule “in order to reduce riskless short-term trading in mutual funds by eliminating
the ability to use late-breaking news to take advantage of NAVs fixed before that news was
released to the markets.” DH2, Inc. v. SEC, 422 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2005).
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purchase and sale of mutual fund shares to take advantage of “mutual
fund mispricing that occurs when market prices for the fund’s
underlying securities have become stale due to events after the
136
relevant trading market has closed.” This occurs especially with
respect to international markets because of time differentials.
Because mutual funds are priced only once a day,137 the fund may rely
upon the closing price of a foreign market that is several hours old in
calculating the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the fund. To the extent
that intervening events occur, that price may undervalue or overvalue
138
the foreign security. Hedge funds can make a quick profit by buying
or selling mutual fund shares with an undervalued or overvalued
NAV.
These practices harm the other investors in the mutual fund.
First, market timing can lead to the dilution of investment gains.139
When the value of a mutual fund increases, that gain is in a sense
divided among the mutual fund’s investors. When a market timer
comes in after the fact and captures part of the gain, the gain must be
divided among more parties. Second, market timing increases the
transaction costs of the mutual fund because the frequent activity
leads to higher commission expenses.140 Mutual fund managers may
find it harder to execute a long term strategy when they must buy and
141
sell shares of stock in response to timing activity.

136. DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 592; see also Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 23
(discussing the strategy of market timing in mutual funds).
137. See DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 592 (“A mutual fund’s share price does not fluctuate
throughout the trading day, but the prices of the securities held by the fund do.”).
138. Id. at 593; see also Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 23 (discussing how the
market timing strategy involves using stale prices that do not reflect the value of a foreign
security).
139. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 25; see also Jason T. Greene & Conrad S.
Ciccotello, Mutual Fund Dilution from Market Timing Trades, 4 J. INVESTMENT MGMT. 31, 37
(2006) (discussing a model of mutual fund dilution).
140. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 27; see also SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund
Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[Market timing] can also harm
investors . . . by increasing trading and brokerage costs, as well as tax liabilities, incurred by a
fund and spread across all fund investors.”); Christopher Oster & Karen Damato, How Market
Timers Can Drain Returns for Some Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2003, at C1 (“Waves of cash
flowing rapidly in and out of a fund increase the commissions that managers pay to buy and sell
securities, and those expenses eat into returns.”).
141. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 27; see also Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt.
LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (“The quick pace of investments and redemptions associated with
market timing may also hinder the ability of mutual fund managers to act in the best interests of
fund investors who seek to maximize their long-term investment gains. It would make little
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Because it harms their investors, many mutual funds represented
in their prospectuses that they prohibited market timing. Contrary to
these representations, the mutual funds agreed to allow certain
investors such as hedge funds to market time their funds in exchange
for an agreement to retain a significant amount of assets in their
funds.142 The mutual funds benefited because they earned
management fees on these “sticky assets.”
3. Lack of Regulation. Why did compliance departments or
regulators fail to prevent these practices? Although many mutual
funds themselves prohibited market timing, there was no rule
prohibiting investors from making multiple transactions in a mutual
fund. Indeed, there was evidence that the SEC knew the industry was
allowing market timing.143 The SEC, however, did not know of the
agreements in which mutual funds allowed favored customers to
market time in return for valuable consideration. Routine
examinations of these mutual funds did not pick up the clandestine
agreements to allow market timing because they did not review
e-mails or trading activity.144 Without such agreements, it is not clear
why market timing should be prohibited. The thought may have been
that the market could take care of any abuses from market timing.
Funds allowing market timing would disclose that fact to investors. If
market timing affected the fund’s returns significantly, investors could
choose to take their money elsewhere.
sense for a fund manager to invest in assets with significant long-term potential but high shortterm volatility if a market timer’s redemptions could force the quick sale of fund assets.”).
142. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 30–33.
143. See Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[As
early as 1993,] Hartford . . . began to observe a negative impact caused by market timing
activity: increased trading and transaction costs, disruption of planned investment strategies,
forced and unplanned portfolio turnover, lost opportunity costs, and large asset swings in a
fund’s asset base that adversely affected Hartford’s ability to provide maximal investment
return to all contract owners.”); Tamar Frankel & Lawrence Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways
of Mutual Funds: Market Timing 235, 256 (Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Paper
187, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1188&context=bc/bclsfp
(“The SEC knew of the excessive purchases and redemptions of mutual fund investors.
However, it seems to have assumed, perhaps reasonably, that fund managers had self-interest in
preventing harmful turnover of investments.”); Macey, supra note 103, at 965–66 (“Late trading
and market timing were not only common practices, but the existence of such practices was well
known to the SEC, which acquiesced in such practices until Mr. Spitzer came along to change
the political climate.”).
144. See Memorandum from Lori A. Richards, Office of Compliance Inspections &
Examinations, to William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, 3 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/apx-ts031004lar.pdf.
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4. The Anti-Fraud and Fiduciary Duty Principles. The New
York Attorney General’s investigation established that the way in
which mutual funds allowed market timing violated basic principles
governing investment companies such as mutual funds.
First, mutual funds that publicly proclaim they prohibit market
timing while privately allowing it are making material
145
misrepresentations to investors. An investor choosing such a mutual
fund relies on the premise that the mutual fund will prohibit practices
that harm the fund’s investors. By failing to disclose market timing
arrangements, mutual funds harmed investors who might have chosen
to place their assets in a mutual fund that did not allow timing of the
market. This violates the anti-fraud principle embodied in section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, and the
Martin Act.146
Second, the market timing arrangements were illegal to the
extent that the mutual fund managers benefited under those
arrangements at the expense of their investors.147 Mutual fund
managers are investment advisers and have basic fiduciary duties to
their investors.148 A fundamental fiduciary principle is that the
fiduciary may not benefit at the expense of the party to whom it has a
149
fiduciary duty. Mutual fund managers benefited from market timing
arrangements that harmed investors because they earned greater
management fees. This violates the fiduciary duty principle embodied
145. See Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
146. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2007); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (noting that legislative
history described section 10(b) as a “catchall” clause enabling the SEC “to deal with new
manipulative [or cunning] devices” (quoting a statement of Thomas Corcoran made on behalf
of the section’s drafters during the Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce) (internal quotations omitted, bracketed insertion in original)).
147. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 856 (D. Md. 2005) (“Although
market timing itself may be lawful, it nevertheless is prohibited by Rule 10b-5 if it is engaged in
by favored market insiders at the expense of long-term mutual fund investors from whom it is
concealed and who have a right to rely upon its prevention by fund advisers’ and managers’
good faith performance of their fiduciary obligations.”); Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341
F. Supp. 2d at 472.
148. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2000); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment
advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—
to render advice which was not disinterested.”); EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832
N.E.2d 26, 31–32 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a common-law fiduciary duty).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
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in the Investment Company Act of 1940 as well as common law
principles.
The New York Attorney General’s enforcement action
demonstrated that market timing, although not itself illegal, was
being conducted in a way that violated fundamental principles. The
SEC followed the New York Attorney General’s lead, and the two
regulators brought additional enforcement actions, which revealed
150
that abusive market timing arrangements were widespread. As a
result, the SEC proposed a wide range of new rules and regulations to
151
reform the mutual fund industry.
III. COMPETING PARADIGMS
Although popular with the public, at least a portion of the
business community has argued that principles-based enforcement
actions are disruptive and unfair. For the most part, the regulated
generally prefer the more predictable rulemaking approach. In
contrast, the public generally prefers the decisiveness of principlesbased enforcement. To some extent, these attitudes reflect different
assumptions about the regulatory scheme and its goals. In this Part, I
show how rulemaking reflects an administrative paradigm preferred
by the regulated whereas principles-based enforcement reflects a
public values paradigm preferred by the public.

150. See, e.g., In re Canadian Imperial Holdings Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8593,
Exchange Act Release No. 52,064, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11987 (July 20, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8593.pdf; In re Banc of Am. Capital Mgmt.,
LLC, Securities Act Release No. 8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,756, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11818 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8538.htm; In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,532, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11590 (Aug. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2277.htm; In re Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448,
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11498 (May 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/admin/34-49741.htm; In re Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,347, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11393 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm; In re Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,312, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11359 (Dec. 18, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2205.htm.
151. See, e.g., Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69
Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004).
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A. Rulemaking and the Administrative Paradigm
There is evidence that for the most part, the regulated prefer that
regulators utilize rulemaking over principles-based enforcement
actions because it is a deliberative approach that they can influence.152
The regulated may not be comfortable with applying broad principles
to particular circumstances, an art monopolized by lawyers trained in
common-law reasoning.153 Principles may give regulators discretion
that potentially can be abused.154 The regulated want clear rules that
specifically tell them what they cannot do, and more importantly,
155
what they can do. The regulated may view questionable conduct as
justified because the rules are unclear. They would prefer that the
regulator clarify the law, not punish the conduct.
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique described in Part I of
this Article reflects this mentality. The critique has tended to
reemerge in response to periods of intensive enforcement activity. In
2006 the Committee on Capital Markets Reform issued a report
criticizing securities regulators for sidestepping the rulemaking
156
process through enforcement actions. The sentiment reflected by
this report is likely to be shared by a significant proportion of the
regulated.
Rulemaking reflects an administrative paradigm with three
characteristics. First, regulatory norms should be defined through the
application of administrative expertise. Second, regulatory norms
should be defined through a broadly participative process. Finally,
regulatory norms should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis.

152. In contrast, it is more difficult for the regulated to influence principles-based
enforcement actions. See John T. Scholz & Feng Heng Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a
Federalist System, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1249, 1250 (1986) (“[The] ability [of interest groups] to
influence enforcement (as opposed to rulemaking) decisions—particularly in regulatory
agencies . . . is limited by case processing requirements . . . .”).
153. See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 562–63 (“[S]tandards are more costly for legal advisors to
predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations of the
law’s content.”).
154. For example, regulators may wrongly conclude that isolated misconduct is indicative of
greater problems that may not exist, falling into the trap of the availability heuristic. See
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25–
26 (2003); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1519 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus
Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 538–46 (2005).
155. See Sunstein, supra note 43, at 971–74.
156. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 63–67.
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1. Administrative Expertise.
The first assumption of the
administrative paradigm is that regulatory norms should be
157
developed by experts. Because the securities markets are complex,
only specialists with experience are qualified to govern them and can
158
assess what rules are appropriate. An administrative agency such as
the SEC depends on its expertise to establish its legitimacy to
159
regulate; and the SEC has such expertise because it deals with the
securities industry on a constant basis—supervising registration of
public offerings, inspecting brokerage firms, and encouraging investor
education. Rulemaking allows experts with deep industry knowledge
to carefully define regulatory norms.160 The rules that administrative
experts promulgate are part of a coherent framework that takes into
161
consideration the holistic experience of the agency.

157. See Grundfest, supra note 52, at 1018 (observing that Congress “wanted to establish an
agency that would specialize in securities-related matters and build expertise not easily captured
within the legislature”); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 305 (1987) (“Delegation is justified
primarily by the complexity of the regulatory tasks assigned and the need for a high level of
expertise.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1518–19 (1992) (describing a New Deal theory justification of bureaucracy
based on agency expertise).
158. See Grundfest, supra note 52, at 966 (“Congress created the Commission as an expert
agency with the capacity to address significant problems affecting the nation’s securities
markets.”).
159. See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 172 (2005) (“The SEC and
defendants have vigilantly reminded us that the securities markets in toto might be better
entrusted to an expert agency than to the federal courts.”), rev’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct.
2383 (2007); SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at xix (“A primary purpose of ‘independent’ regulatory
agencies like the SEC is to allow an experienced and expert staff to resolve specific, highly
technical regulatory problems.”). Gerald Frug illustrates how the law legitimizes bureaucracies
through a rhetoric of expertise. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1322 (1984) (“The concept of administrative expertise, while not itself a
‘doctrine,’ is part of the rhetoric of administrative law opinions that invokes the same kind of
deference to bureaucratic decisions, with the same qualifications, when made by administrative
agencies.”).
160. See Frug, supra note 159, at 1326 (“Administrators are ‘experts’; they decide many
similar cases and they presumably come from backgrounds which make them specialists; all of
this produces a special knowledge in addition to the record.”); Grundfest, supra note 52, at 967
(arguing that the SEC should apply its expertise through rulemaking defining the scope of Rule
10b-5); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1407 (1992) (“Much modern rulemaking is highly technical in nature.”).
Of course, there may be cases in which this ideal is not met and not even the agency has
true expertise. See McGarity, supra, at 1398 (“Although the theoretical rationale for creating
regulatory agencies is to lodge decisionmaking power in the hands of experts, the scientific and
technical needs of modern informal rulemaking have in many cases outstripped the expert
resources of the agencies themselves.”).
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The regulated might prefer regulation by experts because of the
disruption that can occur when those who are perceived as
nonexperts enter the scene. For example, after his investigation
uncovered evidence of fraud, the New York Attorney General
obtained an ex parte injunction against Merrill Lynch requiring it to
implement certain measures with respect to its research practices.162
Under the Investment Advisers Act, an investment adviser under a
163
Thus, the
court injunction cannot offer investment advice.
injunction could have required Merrill Lynch to shut down its
investment advisory business, causing substantial economic
disruption. After the SEC pointed out this possibility, the injunction
was suspended temporarily.164 This example could be used to argue
that regulators who lack administrative expertise may cause
significant disruption when they attempt to regulate the markets.
2. Participative Process. The second characteristic of the
administrative paradigm is that norms should be defined through a
process with procedural safeguards. Because the securities industry is
so complex, even experts may make mistakes when promulgating
rules. This possibility may be magnified when the conduct is in a gray
area. Thus, the rulemaking process as governed by the Administrative
Procedure Act requires that a rule may only be passed after the
regulated and other interested parties are given notice and an
opportunity to comment.165 The notice and comment period helps

161. See Frug, supra note 159, at 1298 (“The [bureaucratic] machine is also a highly
technical and complex device, one that would be damaged by a mere layman’s tinkering.”);
Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, 61 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 123–25 (1998) (“The shift to an agency process dominated by
rulemaking reflected an embrace of the idea of a disinterested ‘science’ of rulemaking, in which
quality of the decisions generated by technological sophistication triumphs over the quality of
the decisions generated by the adversarial process.”). In contrast, a litigation approach may not
adequately mobilize broad expertise. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 883, 916 (2006) (“[C]ase-deciding bodies may not be well situated to engage in the
large-number, systematic, and empirical inquiry that effective rulemaking requires.”).
162. See MASTERS, supra note 134, at 90, 92–93.
163. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(4) (2000).
164. See MASTERS, supra note 134, at 93–94.
165. The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to give notice of “the terms or
substance of the proposed rule” and “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2000); see also Chamber of
Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the Administrative Procedure
Act’s requirement that agencies give notice of a proposed rule).
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regulators ensure that they are not missing considerations that
166
militate against the adoption of the rule. Part of the reason for
allowing such collaboration is that the regulated may have expertise
167
and knowledge that regulators do not.
The regulated prefer an approach that allows them to mitigate
rules that they perceive as unwise and unduly burdensome.
Regulation FD offers an example of how the notice and comment
process works. As initially written, Regulation FD applied to all
168
company employees. The regulated argued successfully through the
comment process that the rule was too broad. If it were applied to all
employees, mid-level employees might not be able to communicate
with suppliers without worrying that they might divulge material
nonpublic information. The SEC agreed and limited the reach of
Regulation FD to senior management and those employees who
regularly deal with research analysts.169 Arguably, the notice and
comment process prevented the promulgation of an overly broad
legal norm.
After the passage of Regulation FD, the SEC went out of its way
to persuade the regulated that Regulation FD would not cause undue
disruption. The SEC chief of enforcement took pains to provide
reassurances that “[d]espite the securities industry’s outcry against
Regulation FD and the flood of alarmist client letters from law firms,
Regulation FD was not intended to be revolutionary.”170 This
comment reflects a desire to take into account the needs of the
regulated in formulating norms in order to minimize disruption. By
doing so, the rulemaking approach may be taking into account the
166. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (“[R]ulemaking would
provide the Board with a forum for soliciting the informed views of those affected in industry
and labor before embarking on a new course.”); Prentice, supra note 118, at 802 (“When the
SEC considers new rules, it uses a process that guarantees that it will receive information and
arguments from all points of view, unlike an individual decision maker prone to seeking out
only information to support preexisting views.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 1561 (arguing
that rulemaking allows for greater deliberation by providing access to different views).
167. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 154, at 24 (“Devising new regulations is costly,
requiring analysis of complicated economic phenomena. Market participants are likely to know
far more about these phenomena than regulators.”).
168. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,787, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590
(proposed Dec. 28, 1999).
169. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,881, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716
(Aug. 24, 2000).
170. Walker, supra note 40.
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political reality that the regulated may mobilize against rules they
perceive are too burdensome.
3. Use of Cost/Benefit Analysis. A third feature of the
administrative paradigm is the use of cost-benefit analysis in
constructing rules.171 Under the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996, the SEC is required to consider in its
rulemaking process “whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.”172 This cost-benefit analysis
requirement limits the types of norms that the rulemaking process
may promulgate. Unless an agency can show that a rule is
economically efficient, its power to adopt such a rule can be limited
by the courts. The administrative paradigm thus envisions that
proposed regulations will be assessed in economic terms.173
The regulated prefer a cost-benefit approach because it puts the
burden on the regulator to prove a change in the status quo is
necessary. The D.C. Circuit’s review of rules passed by the SEC after
the mutual fund scandal illustrates how this burden plays out. The
D.C. Circuit struck down the rule requiring that 75 percent of a
174
mutual fund board be comprised of independent directors. It did so
175
because the SEC had not adequately assessed the cost of the rule.
B. Principles-Based Enforcement Actions and the Public Values
Paradigm
The public is likely to demand that regulators move quickly
against industry exploitation. When the public perceives that the

171. See Macey, supra note 161, at 125 (“[I]n the rulemaking context, government lawyers
are supposed to be weighing both the costs and the benefits of their actions when formulating
rules.”).
172. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416, 3425 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Executive agencies are required to
go through a more formal cost-benefit analysis under executive orders issued by President
Reagan in 1981 that have essentially been ratified by other administrations.
173. The emphasis on cost-benefit analysis with respect to regulations is likely to continue.
In 2006, the Committee on Capital Markets Reform recommended that the SEC should
implement a formal process akin to that of executive agencies and “engage in a more risk-based
process, focused explicitly on the costs and benefits of regulation.” INTERIM REPORT ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 8, 60–62.
174. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908–09 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
175. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (“[T]he Commission violated its
obligation . . . to consider the costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”).
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securities markets are stacked against it, it will demand action to
restore balance. Rulemaking may not meet these demands because it
176
can be slow.
Principles-based enforcement actions may allow regulators to
respond to such demands. By articulating public values, such actions
may decisively address public concerns.177 A rulemaking response may
be perceived as weak and ineffectual, especially if rulemaking failed
to prevent the problems causing the public’s outrage.178 The
principles-based enforcement actions discussed in Part II are
illustrative. Renewed public interest in abusive practices may have led
to Wall Street Journal articles that spurred investigations into abuses
179
relating to the IPO allocation process. Regulators such as the New
York Attorney General responded to public outrage over high-profile
scandals and the perceived ineffectiveness of the SEC by investigating
industry wrongdoing.180 Partly in response to the public sentiment, the
SEC followed the lead of the New York Attorney General and
became more aggressive itself. When regulators found significant
evidence of wrongdoing, they acted decisively, satisfying the public’s
demands.

176. See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 562 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s content . . . .”); McGarity,
supra note 160, at 1387 (“[I]t is difficult to disagree with the conclusion that it is much harder for
an agency to promulgate a rule now than it was twenty years ago.”); Ronald J. Pierce, Jr., Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and
Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 301–02 (“[A]n agency
realistically must conclude that making an important policy decision through the rulemaking
process will require it to commit a significant proportion of its scarce resources to that process
for as much as a decade.”).
177. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Principles and Rules in Public and Professional
Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S.-Canada Inquiry, 6 CANADA STEPS UP 255,
312 (2006) (“An enforcement policy should be supplemented, from time to time, by focused
enforcement activity trained on publicly visible crises. These may erupt as a result of
insufficiently specified underlying laws that require enforcement activity bearing a more
principles-like character, although some public debacles also involve bald violation of clear
rules. Either way, enforcement activities that consciously respond to public outcries are
intended to promote all securities regulation’s goals, of efficiency and fairness and of confidence
and protection. They do so by highlighting and then exterminating behavior deemed
undesirable based upon the public rebuke that provokes stepped-up enforcement.”).
178. The public generally will cast aside expertise when it is perceived as ineffectual. As
James Q. Wilson explains, “Americans value expertise but they do not defer to it; an expert who
takes an unpopular position or acts contrary to the self-interest of an individual or group will be
treated as roughly as any other adversary.” JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 304 (1989).
179. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Part II.B.2; see also MASTERS, supra note 134, at 75–79 (discussing
investigations performed by the New York Attorney General).
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In contrast to the administrative paradigm, which emphasizes the
use of experts, collaboration, and cost-benefit analysis, principlesbased enforcement actions focus on the need to apply societal norms
to industry misconduct. The conduct targeted by the principles-based
actions discussed in Part II was not wrong simply because it violated
NASD Rule 2110, the Martin Act, and common-law fiduciary duties.
It was wrong because it violated basic principles against commercial
bribery, fraud, and self-dealing embodied in those rules, statutes, and
common law. These principles reflect widely accepted societal values
that can only be given meaning through particular application, often
referred to as “public values.”181
The public values paradigm has three characteristics. First,
regulatory norms are defined by regulators with enforcement
expertise rather than administrative expertise. Second, regulatory
norms are defined by a closed process rather than a participatory
process. Finally, regulatory norms embody public values rather than
economic values.
1. Enforcement Expertise. In most cases, enforcement attorneys
are general experts in the litigation and investigative process rather
182
than any particular substantive area of the law. This may be
especially true when state securities regulators are bringing a suit as
opposed to the SEC. Even the SEC’s enforcement staff do not have
the day-to-day interaction with industry that staff in other divisions
such as corporate finance do.183 Moreover, enforcement actions filed

181. The concept of public values was first articulated in the realm of constitutional law,
where scholars such as Owen Fiss argued that adjudication allows courts to give meaning to the
public values embodied in broad constitutional phrases. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court:
1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979). William Eskridge applied the idea to the realm of
statutory interpretation when he observed that statutes embody broad public values that should
influence the way such statutes are interpreted. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1036 (1989) (“[S]tatutes themselves can be the
source of public values.”). As Eskridge notes, it is extremely difficult to precisely define the
meaning of public values. See id. at 1036 n.2. I do not attempt to set forth a general theory of
public values with respect to securities regulation, but instead identify particular values
expressed by recent enforcement actions. See supra Parts II.A.4, II.B.4, II.C.4.
182. See Macey, supra note 161, at 123–25 (contrasting the role of generalist lawyers in
adjudication with the use of experts in the rulemaking process); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note
157, at 263 (noting in case study of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that the
agency was utilizing “case-by-case adjudication which requires little, if any, technological
sophistication and which has no known effects on vehicle safety”).
183. Of course, the Commissioners of the SEC must approve actions by the Enforcement
Division.
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in civil court by the SEC or state securities regulators have the
potential to be decided by nonexpert judges and juries.
The enforcement process relies upon intensive fact gathering and
the application of legal principles to those particular facts rather than
a comprehensive study of regulatory issues. This process crystallizes
the issues and focuses attention on problem areas that may not have
been evident to rulemakers. The cases resulting from the application
of litigation expertise may resonate more powerfully with the public
than technical rules. The New York Attorney General’s enforcement
cases illustrate the role of generalists in defining public values. The
New York Attorney General and his staff members drew on their
general experience as public prosecutors and litigators rather than
any particularized expertise with respect to the industry in
investigating and bringing cases against research analysts and the
184
mutual fund industry. Their investigations led to examples of
wrongdoing that resonated with the public and resulted in significant
reform.
2. Closed Process. In contrast to the administrative paradigm,
which is premised on broad participation in defining regulatory
norms, the public values paradigm envisions a closed process with two
parties, the regulator and the target. Rather than eliciting industry
opinion through a notice and comment process, principles-based
enforcement actions use document subpoenas and investigative
testimony to elicit facts. Although the knowledge developed by
principles-based enforcement does not necessarily reflect a wide
range of opinions,185 it tends to be more detailed and relevant than the
information generated by the rulemaking comment process.
A closed process allows regulators to negotiate reforms in
response to a particular wrong without industry interference. They
can then spur change by applying reforms derived from settlements to
those who committed similar types of wrongdoing. For example, in
the Merrill Lynch case, as a result of specific evidence of wrongdoing
by its research analysts, Merrill Lynch negotiated a settlement that

184. See MASTERS, supra note 134, at 133–69.
185. See Croley, supra note 2, at 116 (“While the effects of adjudicatory decisions can, like
rulemakings, be far reaching, adjudication processes are less open.”); McGarity, supra note 160,
at 1393 (observing that, unlike rulemaking, adjudication fails to provide for notice and
comment, thus “both regulatees and regulatory beneficiaries are deprived of the open
opportunity that informal rulemaking provides to influence the agencies’ thinking”).

02__PARK.DOC

2007]

12/20/2007 10:10:17 AM

SECURITIES REGULATION

671

established norms governing the relationship between its investment
186
banking and research departments. This settlement was the model
for a global settlement involving the other major investment banking
187
firms that implemented significant structural reforms. In addition,
the case helped spur rulemaking that caused significant change. Once
one party agrees to a set of reforms, there is momentum that can be
188
difficult to resist.
3. Application of Values. Rather than using the language of
cost-benefit analysis, the public values paradigm relies upon the
rhetoric of values. Principles-based enforcement actions do not ask
whether a legal norm is economically efficient or technically sound,
but whether the conduct violates an established principle.189 The
securities laws do not just reflect economic norms. For example,
Donald Langevoort observes that the insider-trading laws are partly
based on “the belief in the expressive function of law generally—the
idea that both law and society are better off if the law systematically
expresses certain virtues.”190 Principles-based enforcement actions
give meaning to the public values reflected in principles by applying

186. MASTERS, supra note 134, at 102.
187. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
188. This has been controversial. As the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital
Markets in the 21st Century reported:
[T]he Commission repeatedly heard concerns about the SEC’s use of ‘undertakings’
in enforcement action settlements to impose requirements that suggest industry-wide
application to regulated entities. . . . [T]he concerns addressed instances in which the
SEC required an undertaking in a settlement agreement that itself constituted a
change in the law, which was then later applied to the entire securities industry.
COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT
RECOMMENDATIONS 123 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission.
com/portal/capmarkets/default.htm.
189. For example, in the context of automobile safety, Professor Mashaw and Mr. Harfst
observe that issues are framed technically when rulemaking is involved, and framed in
layperson’s terms in enforcement cases involving defective vehicles. See Mashaw & Harfst,
supra note 157, at 304 (“[T]he defects question is not framed as a technological, scientific, or
economic issue. The questions are straightforward and commonsensical. Should people expect
steering arms to break, wheels to collapse, or windshield wipers to fly off? Obviously not.”).
Of course, there is a large body of economics literature that analyzes enforcement
decisions through a cost-benefit framework. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Optimum
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526–27 (1970) (arguing that society gives up
complete enforcement of a rule because enforcement is costly). But as a practical matter, there
are no legal standards requiring agencies to consider cost-benefit factors in deciding whether to
bring an enforcement case.
190. Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1999).
AND
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them to particular situations. Principles-based regulation requires the
regulated to act as moral agents who assess whether their conduct
conforms with the principles reflecting those values, not just whether
their conduct violates a cost-effective rule.
The language of public values can resonate more powerfully with
the public than the rhetoric of costs and benefits. In contrast to the
collaborative dialogue associated with Regulation FD, the New York
Attorney General’s rhetoric in connection with the research analyst
case illustrates the public values approach. On announcing the case,
the New York Attorney General stated: “This was a shocking
betrayal of trust by one of Wall Street’s most trusted names . . . . The
191
case must be a catalyst for reform throughout the entire industry.”
This approach conveys a sense that a fundamental value has been
breached, not just that an economically efficient rule was violated.
With such a breach, the regulator asserts authority rather than
persuasion in establishing a legal norm.
C. Tension between Paradigms
Rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions thus
reflect different assumptions about the regulatory scheme and its
purposes. The administrative paradigm emphasizes a predictable
regulatory regime whereas the public values paradigm emphasizes the
punishment of misconduct. These paradigms reflect the dualism in
society’s relationship with markets. Society views markets through a
pragmatic, utilitarian lens, as a wealth generator that should be
regulated with care. This mentality is reflected in discourse that a
stable regulatory regime may make markets more attractive to
foreign companies.192 Rulemaking and the administrative paradigm fit
within this vision. But society also disapproves of systematic
exploitation of the public by the market. Perhaps the public reaction
to the scandals uncovered by securities regulators reflects an
underlying consensus that such conduct violates basic public values.
To the extent that markets rely upon public confidence, there is a
need to address these concerns through aggressive enforcement.
In an ideal world, these paradigms would easily coexist.
Regulators would predict problem areas, promulgate cost-effective
191. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System
Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Spitzer Obtains Court Order Requiring Key
Disclosure (Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html.
192. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 66.
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rules, and companies that violate those rules would be punished. The
regulated would be committed to following basic principles and those
who did not would be punished. And perhaps there are times when
there is such equilibrium.
Regulators certainly use both tools in responding to arguable
misconduct. All of the principles-based enforcement actions discussed
in Part II led to significant rulemaking. The sequence, though, makes
a difference. When principles-based enforcement actions are the first
response, rulemaking tends to mirror reforms implemented by the
193
settlement terms of the principles-based enforcement action.
Indeed, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation has criticized
194
such rules as not conforming with normal rulemaking procedures.
In contrast, when rulemaking is the initial response, subsequent
enforcement is more likely to be rules-based, not principles-based.
The reality is that there are times when there is tension between
the paradigms. The rules do not anticipate significant issues and the
regulated are either unaware that their conduct violates principles or
simply ignore them. As a result, regulators must choose between a
rulemaking response that may be perceived as deliberative but
coddling industry and a principles-based enforcement response that is
decisive but seen as disruptive.
To some extent, the surge in principles-based enforcement
actions discussed in Part II can be seen as a temporary rejection of
the administrative paradigm in favor of a public values approach. The
result has been a significant amount of controversy as evidenced by
the reemergence of the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique.195 The
administrative paradigm can be less disruptive than the public values
paradigm because it cloaks regulation in the neutral language of
administrative expertise and cost-benefit analysis. The shift from
rulemaking’s rhetoric of utility and cost-benefit analysis to the moral
tone of enforcement actions unleashed previously repressed
controversy about the shape of public values.196 Some may argue that
regulators, who are not necessarily elected, should not have the

193. See supra notes 95, 151 and accompanying text.
194. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 66.
195. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
196. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 414
(1999) (describing the role of the deterrence idiom in muting societal conflict relating to
controversial norms).
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197
power to define those values on an ad hoc basis. The subjects of
principles-based enforcement actions may feel unfairly persecuted
based on what they perceive is an illegitimate vision of the public
good that may not be universally accepted.

IV. CHOOSING BETWEEN RULEMAKING AND ENFORCEMENT
Given the tension between the administrative and public values
paradigms, how do regulators choose between rulemaking and
principles-based enforcement actions in responding to arguable
misconduct?198 This Part first observes that in light of the respective
preferences of the public and the regulated, public choice theory
might contend that principles-based enforcement actions are more
likely when public influence is high and rulemaking is more likely
when the regulated have greater influence. This Part then argues that
this account is incomplete because regulators are more constrained in
their choices than public choice theory assumes. Even if they are
constrained, regulators should counter the perception that interest

197. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353
(2001) (“[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor special competence to make the
value judgments—the essentially political choices—that underlie most administrative
policymaking.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 1570–71 (noting risk that administrative
“decisionmakers will implement their idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest rather
than society’s consensus about that interest”).
198. Of course, one might argue that the SEC did not really choose to bring a principlesbased enforcement action in the research analyst and mutual fund cases. Rather, the SEC was
pressured by the success of the New York Attorney General’s approach to bring its own cases.
It is difficult to know whether the SEC would have taken the same approach without the
prompting of the New York Attorney General. In any event, the SEC at the very least had the
discretion to follow the New York Attorney General’s lead in bringing principles-based
enforcement actions. And the New York Attorney General had the choice to defer to the SEC’s
rulemaking approach.
As noted before, under Chenery, it is widely accepted that administrative agencies have
broad discretion in making such choices. Elizabeth Magill theorizes that courts give agencies
such leeway because they can regulate the aftereffects of agency decisions. See Magill, supra
note 2, at 1437 (“Courts’ ability to shape some of the consequences of an agency’s choice of
procedure explains the continued strength of the Chenery principle.”). This dynamic was
evident in the mutual fund cases. Regulators chose to use enforcement actions to impose fines
and structural reforms such as requiring that a settling mutual fund agree that 75 percent of its
board would consist of independent directors. The SEC then attempted to apply the 75 percent
independent director requirement to the mutual fund industry as a whole through rulemaking.
See Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472 (proposed Jan. 23, 2004). The rule was
challenged and the D.C. Circuit struck it down on the basis that the SEC had not adequately
assessed the cost of the rule. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908–09 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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groups drive their choices by considering certain criteria to guide
their choices. Finally, this Part offers such a framework.
A. Public Choice Theory and Regulatory Choice
Many commentators have observed that there is a relationship
between the business cycle and the production of securities
199
regulation. During boom times, industry has more influence, there
is less public demand for regulation, regulators tend to be more
cautious, and less new regulation is produced. Busts tend to reveal
scandals that cause public outrage, reducing industry influence,
emboldening regulators, and leading to the passage of more
restrictive laws. An example of such a law is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which Congress passed in response to public pressure after the
collapse of Enron.200
These arguments can be seen as a form of public choice theory,
which has long been an influential framework for explaining the
production of regulation. In essence, public choice theory predicts
that interest groups, including industry and regulators themselves, can
influence the type of regulation produced.201 Variations of this theory
predict different outcomes. The earliest form of public choice theory
argued that for the most part, industries would capture regulatory
agencies and that regulation would usually be produced for the
199. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396 (2006) (discussing the interplay between the
business cycle, the cycle of investor confidence/investor trust, and the political
economy/regulatory cycle); Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of
United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002) (noting that changes in
securities law have been provoked by perceived failures in the capital markets); Larry E.
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79–83 (2003) (describing the boom-bubble-bustregulate cycle of financial market regulation). See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New
Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997) (arguing that new
technology over time has not caused new securities regulation, but rather, crashes have); Frank
Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000)
(using finance and legal scholarship to critique theories of why markets crash, and to make
recommendations regarding what law can do about crashes).
200. Roberta Romano argues that statutes passed after periods of market turmoil often
contain problematic provisions and that such statutes should provide for reevaluation at a later
date. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1599–1602 (2005).
201. See Vivek Ghosal & Joseph Gallo, The Cyclical Behavior of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Enforcement Activity, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 27, 30 (2001); Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976); George Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 4 (1971). For a summary of public choice
theory, see Croley, supra note 2, at 34–41.
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202
benefit of the regulated. Later versions were less pessimistic and
observed that regulators would balance the demands of the regulated
with the demands of the public.203 Regulators are constrained in their
capacity to give in to the regulated to the extent that doing so harms
the public interest and their own interests. Thus, regulation can be
seen as a function of balancing competing interest group preferences.
The boom/bust literature essentially links the relative influence
of the regulated and public with the production of regulation. This
literature, however, does not differentiate among types of securities
regulation, and focuses largely on the passage of statutes by
Congress.204 The question of how interest groups can affect the choice
between rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions by
205
securities regulators has not been examined.
If one accepts the argument that the public generally prefers
principles-based enforcement whereas the regulated prefer
rulemaking, public choice theory might predict that regulators will be
more likely to punish arguable misconduct with principles-based
enforcement when public influence is high and address arguable
misconduct through rulemaking when the influence of the regulated
is high. When there is an economic collapse, the public may perceive
that the bust is caused by industry wrongdoing. The public may press
for regulatory action and regulators will respond by acting
aggressively to find and punish blatant misconduct. On the other
hand, when the economy is booming, the public may demand less
action and the regulated will have more sway. As a result, regulators
may act more cautiously and collaboratively through rulemaking.
Public choice theory might also explain the resurgence of actions
by state regulators. When the influence of the regulated is high, the
SEC may become captured and more likely to act slowly through
rulemaking. State regulators have incentives to fill the gap by
bringing aggressive principles-based enforcement actions that
resonate with the public. The SEC might then be forced to respond in
turn by following the lead of state regulators to regain its credibility
with the public.

202. See Stigler, supra note 201, at 3.
203. See Peltzman, supra note 201, at 212.
204. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
205. See Magill, supra note 2, at 1442–43 (“There are few efforts to describe or explain how
agencies choose among their available policymaking forms.”).
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Over time, the public choice model would predict shifts in
regulatory choice. To the extent that one group’s interests are met,
the other group’s interests are antagonized, leading that group to
mobilize to further its interests. A period of extensive principlesbased enforcement actions may cause a backlash that will make
regulators more cautious and shift to rulemaking responses to
arguable misconduct. A period in which an overly cautious
rulemaking response predominates may cause significant regulatory
gaps, increasing industry exploitation of the public, leading to greater
206
public demand for regulatory action.
One can interpret the shift from rulemaking to principles-based
enforcement actions as an example in which the choice of one
regulatory tool led to conduct requiring the choice of a different
regulatory tool. Prior to the actions described in Part II, the influence
of the regulated through the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique
fostered a tendency to respond to arguable misconduct through
rulemaking. For various reasons, industry began acting more
aggressively in areas in which rules were unclear, arguably ignoring
207
fundamental principles. As the public became more invested in the
market and concerned about corporate failures such as Enron, the
demand for decisive action became greater. Securities regulators
became more aggressive in issuing subpoenas and uncovered abuses
fostered in areas in which there were regulatory gaps. As a result,
there was a shift to principles-based enforcement actions and the
public values paradigm.
Public choice theory might predict that the prevalence of
principles-based enforcement actions and the public values paradigm
may have sown the seeds for a regulatory shift back to an emphasis
on rulemaking and the administrative paradigm. The regulated have

206. See John C. Coates, IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 535 (2001) (predicting that devolution of securities
regulation would lead to backlash and reregulation).
207. As Joel Seligman describes:
A widespread belief evolved in the United States financial community that time
honored rules such as those that discourage conflicts of interest were quaint and
easily circumvented. Too frequently, sharp practitioners in business, investment
banking, accounting or law challenged the fundamental tenets of “full disclosure of
material information” or “fair presentation of accounting results.” A deterioration in
the integrity of the corporate governance and mandatory disclosure systems occurred,
not because of a novel strain of human cupidity, but because there was so much
success, for so long, that some began to forget why fundamental principles of full
disclosure and corporate accountability long were considered essential.
SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 623.
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begun mobilizing in response to perceived regulatory overreaching.
Since 2006, three high-profile reports by the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation, McKinsey & Co., and the Commission on the
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century have argued
that the regulatory climate is too harsh and may deter foreign issuers
from raising funds in the United States.209 Targets may be more likely
to fight, raising the cost of bringing principles-based enforcement
210
actions.
The public’s demand for change may have been sated by the
flurry of regulatory activity described in Part II. Over time, regulators
may exhaust the cases in which there is clear evidence of specific
conduct causing public harm. As a result, the determinants of
regulatory choice may move back toward rulemaking and the
administrative paradigm.
B. Limits of the Public Choice Theory
Regulators would object to the public choice explanation of their
regulatory decisions. They would do so primarily on the ground of
211
Regulators, for the most part, do not view
professionalism.
themselves as taking action based on the influence of interest
212
groups. And indeed, their decisions are subject to important
constraints. In particular, regulators might argue that their choice of a
regulatory tool is largely determined by the nature of the evidence of
arguable wrongdoing they find.
To bring a principles-based enforcement action, there must be
particularized evidence of conduct that violates a principle. Without
such evidence, any action would fail. The principles-based

208. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at xi
(arguing that the increase in regulatory intensity in the U.S. has hurt its markets).
209. See id.; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 7, at ii; COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF
U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 187, at 1.
210. See Scholz & Wei, supra note 152, at 1253 (“Business, on the other hand, can increase
the cost of enforcement actions [through appeals].”).
211. See id. at 1251 (“[Many studies] discount political influences over bureaucratic
activities, explaining agency behavior in terms of the professionalism of enforcement staffs,
established work routines, task requirements for detecting and prosecuting violations, attitudes
towards regulated firms, and more idiosyncratic behavior of inspectors.”).
212. A regulator would contend that its choices are unlike the legislative responses to
recessions described in the boom/bust literature. Legislatures have more discretion to pass
legislation for political reasons. Indeed, that is their job. Securities law statutes are rarely, if
ever, challenged on constitutional grounds. In contrast, regulators must assume they will have to
prove their cases in court and must follow administrative procedures when passing rules.
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enforcement actions described in Part II succeeded not simply
because they catered to a public need, but because they uncovered
213
documents such as e-mails detailing the wrongdoing. It was this
evidence that spurred the public outrage leading to substantial
reforms. Regulators would point out that if they simply brought
principles-based enforcement actions without such evidence, there
would be little likelihood that the allegations would have a significant
public impact, making it less likely that a target would feel pressure to
settle the case, thereby increasing the cost of principles-based
enforcement. More importantly, they would not be acting consistent
with their duty as officers of the court if they brought actions without
a basis.
Regulators might also point out that they do not use rulemaking
simply to cater to the regulated. Rulemaking may be spurred when
there is generalized evidence of a problem but no specific evidence of
particular wrongdoing. In some circumstances, rules can have a more
significant impact on misconduct than isolated enforcement actions.
Indeed, the principles-based enforcement actions discussed in Part II
may have had the greatest impact in the way that they resulted in
systemic rulemaking. Moreover, regulators would object to the idea
that they are simply captured by industry through the rulemaking
process. Regulators would contend that their duty is to act in the
public interest and that they do not blindly craft rules that favor the
regulated.
Moreover, a critic of public choice theory might argue that its
conception of causation is too simplistic. It is difficult to distinguish
between cause and effect with respect to regulatory choices. Although
public attention may spur principles-based enforcement, it may be
just as likely that principles-based enforcement spurs public attention.
Similarly, though industry influence may lead to rulemaking, the
decision to use rulemaking may lead to industry influence.
A proponent of public choice theory might respond that
although responsiveness to interest groups may not totally determine
regulatory choice, it must have some impact. Despite the
professionalism of regulators, it is hard to deny that the public’s
attention may magnify the impact of the cases they bring. For
example, the actions against the research analysts may not have

213. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 31–45; Canary Complaint, supra note 16,
at paras. 59–62, 68–72, 75–76, 89, 93; Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 2, 17.
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resonated as much if they had not come after a significant market
meltdown. And there may be more pressure to bring questionable
cases when public pressure is high. Certainly regulators have
incentives to search for particular evidence of wrongdoing after
periods of excess. But that does not mean that they always find it.
Regardless of whether regulators are influenced by public sentiment,
their actions will not have significant impact if they are based on no
more than speculation.
The truth is likely somewhere in between. Regulators have
greater incentives to respond to arguable misconduct by developing
principles-based enforcement cases when public influence is high, but
they are subject to an important constraint—they must find specific
evidence of wrongdoing. In contrast, regulators may have a greater
incentive to respond to arguable misconduct through rulemaking
when the influence of the regulated is high, but they are subject to the
constraint that they must follow procedures meant to protect the
public interest.
C. A Framework for Determining Regulatory Choice
Even assuming there are meaningful constraints on regulatory
choice, regulators should counter the perception that they cater to
specific interests. Shifts in regulatory emphasis from rulemaking to
principles-based enforcement can create instability. Although legal
transitions are inevitable and perhaps no different economically than
other unexpected occurrences affecting markets such as storms or
214
recessions, it can be difficult for firms to meaningfully assess the
risks of regulatory shifts.215 With the surge in principles-based
enforcement actions described in Part II, there is a perception among
some that the regulatory system is in disarray, with authority
emanating from too many sources.216
The tension between the administrative and public values
paradigms is at the heart of the problem. On the one hand, the
214. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 534
(1986) (“[T]here is little to distinguish losses arising from government and market risk. For
purposes of analyzing risk and incentive issues, the source of the uncertainty is largely
irrelevant. A private actor should be indifferent as to whether a given probability of loss will
result from the action of competitors, an act of government, or an act of God . . . .”).
215. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 66
(“When new standards are introduced through specific enforcement actions and only later
codified as explicit rules, confusion and distrust are likely to be the consequences.”).
216. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 7, at 81–85.
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administrative framework is meant to provide a set of cost-effective
rules that the regulated can rely upon in assessing their conduct. On
the other, the reality is that these rules are not perfect and that the
regulated must also assess their conduct in relation to abstract
principles. Because there has been little effort to synthesize these two
schemes, the regulatory system seems chaotic.
But the tension between the administrative and public values
paradigms should not be seen as an inevitability. There is no reason
why the paradigms cannot coexist. A regulatory system can give clear
notice of actionable conduct while punishing conduct that violates
public values. Both rulemaking and principles-based enforcement
actions serve important functions in defining regulatory norms.
Some of these concerns might be addressed by a clearer
framework for assessing when a principles-based enforcement
approach is appropriate. Such a framework should attempt to referee
the tension between the overlapping but distinct frameworks of rules
and principles. To the extent that regulators are guided by such a
framework, they might mitigate concerns that they are disrupting the
rulemaking regime mainly in response to public pressure. Moreover,
if regulators have clearer guidance as to when it is appropriate to use
a principles-based enforcement action, they can act decisively when
the proper situation arises, reducing the risk of agency capture.
Such a framework should be synthetic, in that it balances the
concerns of the administrative paradigm—fair notice, collaboration,
and cost-effective norms—with the concerns of the public values
paradigm—confrontation of wrongdoing that violates fundamental
values. Regulators should consider four criteria in determining
whether principles-based enforcement or rulemaking is appropriate
in responding to arguable misconduct.
First, is the principle to be applied in the absence of a clearly
applicable rule well established, or is it novel? If the principle is well
established, then the fair notice concerns of the administrative
paradigm might be addressed. Moreover, the conduct would more
likely implicate the fundamental values that are part of the public
values paradigm. If the principle is novel, then fair notice concerns
become more significant and the conduct may be less likely to violate
values on which there is societal consensus.
Second, is the issue raised by the misconduct addressed by
existing rules, or is there an inadvertent gap in the rules that has been
exploited? If the rulemaking process envisioned the alleged
misconduct and decided it should not be prohibited, then the
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regulated may be entitled to rely upon the judgment of the rules
framework. On the other hand, if the rulemaking process simply
failed to envision the issue and the regulated are merely exploiting a
gap, there may be less of a need to refrain from punishing the conduct
with a principles-based enforcement action.
Third, is there particularized evidence of wrongdoing, or is there
only generalized evidence of wrongdoing? If there is particularized
evidence establishing the wrongdoing, there may be a greater case for
choosing a principles-based enforcement action, but if the evidence of
wrongdoing is more generalized, rulemaking might be more
appropriate.
Fourth, is the public harmed in a significant way by the
misconduct? Did the wrongdoer know that the misconduct would
cause public harm? If misconduct has minimal effects on the public,
the case for punishing the misconduct with a principles-based
enforcement action is weaker. If the misconduct causes significant
public harm and the wrongdoer is aware the conduct will cause harm,
the case for confronting such wrongdoing with a principles-based
enforcement action is stronger.
To illustrate this synthetic framework in a more concrete way, I
apply it to five possible scenarios of arguable misconduct (these are
not meant to be exhaustive):
(1) conduct violates a principle set forth in a rule;
(2) conduct violates both a rule and a principle;
(3) conduct is in an area that is unregulated by rules, does not
violate a rule, but violates a principle;
(4) conduct is in an area that is heavily regulated by rules, does
not violate a rule, but violates a principle; and
(5) conduct is sanctioned by a rule but violates a principle.
The case for choosing a principles-based action in response to
arguable misconduct is strongest in situation (1) and weakest in
situation (5).
1. Conduct Violates a Principle Set Forth in a Rule. When
conduct violates a principle set forth in a rule, it is more likely that
the principle is well established and the regulated should be aware
that they will be subject to that principle. Thus, the case for a
principles-based enforcement action can be strong.
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The primary example of a principle embodied by a rule is the
217
anti-fraud principle set forth in SEC Rule 10b-5. There is broad
societal agreement that fraud harms the public because it leads to
218
inefficient markets and is morally reprehensible. Because the
principle has been applied in a wide variety of cases over time, courts
have been able to create limitations governing anti-fraud actions.
Those limits include the requirement that wrongdoers act with
scienter, or recklessness, in order for liability to attach, as well as that
the fraud is material, or likely to affect the decision of a reasonable
investor.219 Because the anti-fraud principle has been defined by both
rulemaking and adjudication, it is the quintessential example of a well
established principle.220
Moreover, when a principle is embodied in a rule, it is more
likely that actions enforcing the principle are consistent with the
regulatory scheme. For example, although there are rules that
exhaustively detail the types of information a company must disclose
for a securities offering,221 anti-fraud actions can also be brought
targeting misrepresentations and omissions not covered by those
rules. No one argues that these actions somehow disrupt the rules
governing the disclosure process.
The case for bringing a particular anti-fraud action turns on
whether there is specific evidence of such fraud. The case against
Merrill Lynch for fraudulent misstatements by research analysts was a
fairly straightforward application of the anti-fraud principle. There
was specific and powerful evidence from which fraud could be
reasonably inferred. Although Merrill Lynch may have been able to
argue with the characterization of the facts, if the allegations were
true and research analysts knowingly misrepresented the prospects of
companies, such conduct contravened a well established principle

217. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
218. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The optimal
amount of fraud is zero.”).
219. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
220. Of course, there is always room for more clarity with respect to the standard of liability.
See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1,
at 12, 80 (arguing that the SEC should further define the elements of Rule 10b-5).
221. 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228.
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contained in a rule. Thus, there was a strong case for a principles222
based enforcement action.
2. Conduct Violates both a Rule and a Principle. When conduct
violates both a rule and a principle, the case for a principles-based
enforcement action can also be strong. Even if the principle is not
well-defined, if the conduct independently violates a rule, the
wrongdoer has notice that the conduct is prohibited. Moreover, it
may be likely that if the conduct is condemned by both a rule and a
principle, the application of the principle is in accord with existing
rules. The principle and rule working in tandem may provide a strong
case for condemning certain conduct. Of course, the decision will
likely hinge on the strength of the evidence establishing misconduct
as well as whether the conduct caused public harm.
The CSFB case is an example of an instance in which conduct
violated both a rule and a principle. The quid pro quo arrangements
in which CSFB traded a share in IPO profits for kickbacks arguably
violated NASD Rule 2330(f), which prohibits profit sharing
223
arrangements. But if that had been the only violation, there may not
have been sufficient justification for a $100 million sanction. NASD
Rule 2330(f) was meant to protect consumers and no consumers were
directly harmed. The conduct not only violated the text of a specific
rule, it also violated a broader principle against bribery in commercial
transactions.224 The rule and the principle in this case worked in
tandem. NASD Rule 2330(f) explained why the conduct was
technically wrong, the anti-commercial bribery principle explained
why the conduct was fundamentally wrong and was punished so
harshly. The evidence of quid pro quo arrangements was specific and
strong, and there was an argument that such commercial bribery
tainted the public markets. Thus, there was a case for a principlesbased enforcement action.
3. Conduct Is Unregulated by a Rule but Violates a Principle. A
more difficult case is when conduct occurs in an area that is
unregulated by rules but violates a principle. In such circumstances,
the regulator will have to carefully assess whether the violated

222. The question of the appropriateness of the structural reforms that resulted should be
addressed in a separate paper.
223. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
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principle is well established and whether the lack of rules is deliberate
or just an inadvertent gap. The regulated might argue that the fact
that there is no rule indicates that regulators have sent the message
225
that the conduct will be unregulated. The regulated may argue that
in such cases, the arguable misconduct should be excused and
rulemaking used to prohibit the conduct going forward. As with all
cases, the decision to proceed by principles-based enforcement
actions in such circumstances will rely heavily on the specificity of the
evidence and the extent of public harm.
The mutual fund cases fit within this scenario. There were no
rules regulating market timing but the existence of market timing
arrangements may have violated fiduciary duty principles.226 One
could argue that the application of fiduciary duty principles was
novel. Although the idea that investment advisers were fiduciaries
was long established, there was relatively little precedent for
aggressively enforcing these duties through principles-based
enforcement.227 Of course, there was also an anti-fraud theory. Mutual
funds publicly proclaimed that they prohibited market timing to their
investors while secretly and knowingly allowing some investors to do
it in exchange for compensation. Although there were no rules
specifically prohibiting market timing arrangements, there is no
indication that this gap was a deliberate part of the regulatory
scheme. There was clear evidence of market timing arrangements in
e-mails.228 Moreover, mutual funds were clearly aware that these
market timing arrangements hurt investors because of their policies
prohibiting market timing.229 In sum, there was a strong case that
principles-based enforcement actions were an appropriate response
to market timing arrangements.

225. See SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(noting that defendant “seeks to avoid liability by asserting what may be considered the
‘everyone was doing it’ defense; since secret market timing arrangements were widespread in
the industry . . . [the defendant] seems to suggest that he cannot be charged with violating his
own fiduciary duties towards his investors”).
226. Of course, there was a rule prohibiting late trading. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2007).
But that rule did not address the issue of market timing.
227. See Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC,
Speech to the Eighth Annual Investment Adviser Compliance Summit, Wash., D.C.: Fiduciary
Duty: Return to First Principles (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch022706lar.htm.
228. See Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 76, 89.
229. See id. at paras. 34, 74, 84–85, 92, 94; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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4. Conduct Is in an Area Heavily Regulated by Rules but
Violates a Principle.
The case for using a principles-based
enforcement action may be more controversial when the conduct is in
an area heavily regulated by rules, does not violate a rule, but violates
a principle. In such a case, one might make an argument similar to the
rationale for the implied immunity doctrine, which immunizes actors
from antitrust liability when there is a clear repugnancy between the
securities laws and antitrust principles.230 But the analogy is not
perfect because a securities law principle is more likely to be in
accordance with the underlying system of rules than an antitrust
principle.
Accounting fraud cases often fit this scenario. Accounting
decisions are made pursuant to technical rules that are arguably
comprehensive. Yet that has not precluded principles-based
enforcement actions when there is specific evidence of wrongdoing
violating a well established principle. The decision by Judge Henry
231
Friendly in United States v. Simon is illustrative. In that case, the
defendants, who were auditors, argued they could not be found guilty
of participating in a financial fraud if the financial statements
complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
The district court judge instead instructed the jury that the “‘critical
test’ was whether the financial statements as a whole ‘fairly presented
the financial position of [the audited company]’” and that although
compliance with GAAP was persuasive, it was not conclusive in
establishing good faith.232 Judge Friendly approved the charge,
holding that compliance with GAAP did not excuse the accountants
from complying with the greater principle that “an accountant is
under [a] duty to disclose what he knows when he had reason to
believe that, to a material extent, a corporation is being operated not
to carry out its business in the interest of all the stockholders but for

230. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2392 (2007). Clear
repugnancy is determined through consideration of four factors:
(1) the existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to supervise the
activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise
that authority; and (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust laws, if both
applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or
standards of conduct. . . . (4) . . . the possible conflict affect[s] practices that lie
squarely within an area of financial market activity that the securities law seeks to
regulate.
Id.
231.
232.

United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
Id. at 805–06.
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233
the private benefit of its president.” Under Simon, it appears that
principles-based enforcement actions relating to accounting may be
appropriate when there is clear evidence that the accountant’s
inaction, although not violating GAAP, violates the accountant’s
fundamental duty to disclose certain types of material self-dealing.234

5. Conduct Is Sanctioned by a Rule but Violates a Principle. The
case for a principles-based enforcement action is weakest when the
conduct is sanctioned by a rule but arguably violates a principle. In
such a case, even if the principle is well established, the application of
the principle would not be in accordance with the underlying
regulatory scheme. Such a situation likely raises the same concerns
addressed by the implied immunity doctrine, which immunizes
conduct when there is a “clear repugnancy” between the regulatory
system and liability standard,235 and applying the principle would lead
236
to “duplicative and inconsistent standards.”
An example is the scrutiny of “soft dollar” payments made by
institutional investors such as mutual funds to brokers. As discussed
earlier, only a portion of the commission for a stock transaction pays
for the actual execution of the transaction. Part of the commission is
understood as paying for research and other services. Section 28(e) of
237
the Securities Exchange Act expressly permits this practice. After
the regulatory attention of the market timing scandals, there was
renewed scrutiny of “soft dollar” payments. There were reports that
“soft dollar” payments were being used not only to pay for research,
but other expenses such as computers, overhead, and tickets to
sporting events.238 Although such payments might violate certain
fiduciary duty principles, Section 28(e) might be fairly read to allow
such practices. Because the application of the fiduciary duty principle
to such conduct would be novel and not in accordance with the
regulatory scheme, a principles-based enforcement action might not

233. Id. at 806.
234. And the “fairly presents” principle has been codified by Sarbanes-Oxley. See SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 § 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. V 2005).
235. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 127 S. Ct. at 2391.
236. Id. Of course, the “implied immunity” standard has not been applied to bar liability
based on the securities laws, and I do not mean to imply that it should, but the concept is useful
in analyzing the interaction between rules and principles.
237. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000).
238. See, e.g., Christopher Oster & Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds’ Soft Fees Getting a Hard
Look, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at C1.
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be appropriate. Consistent with this approach, the SEC has addressed
the issue by providing interpretative guidance with respect to the
239
scope of Section 28(e).
Regulators should be cognizant, though, of attempts to falsely
characterize conduct as being sanctioned by rules. One example is the
case of Enron and its treatment of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs).
Enron’s argument for the legitimacy of these SPVs was that an
independent entity had a 3 percent ownership interest in the SPVs,
and thus they could be treated as off Enron’s balance sheet. Enron’s
argument implied that there was a 3 percent rule under GAAP under
which it could account for SPVs in this way. But there was no such
rule. As William Bratton explains, the purported rule derived from a
1991 letter from the SEC accountant, which “never intended three
percent to be taken as a one-size fits-all test.”240 Indeed, “[s]ince 1991,
the SEC has insisted repeatedly that there is no three percent
241
test . . . .” Thus, the argument that such conduct is immune from
attack by principles-based enforcement actions falls flat.
*

*

*

Public choice theory might predict that regulators choose
between principles-based enforcement actions and rulemaking based
on the relative influence of the public and the regulated. Although
the choice is certainly influenced by the economic and social climate,
regulators are constrained in their choice by the type of evidence they
uncover. The challenge of choosing between principles-based
enforcement and rulemaking is synthesizing the concerns of the
administrative and public law paradigms. In making this choice,
regulators should consider whether the principle they are enforcing is
novel or well established, whether the principle is in accord with
existing rules, whether there is compelling evidence establishing the
wrongdoing, and whether the public is harmed.

239. Indeed, the SEC published guidance on the scope of Section 28(e) in 2006. See
Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34–54165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978 (July 24, 2006).
240. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2003).
241. Id.
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CONCLUSION
At first glance, securities regulation appears to be comprised of
two incompatible competing paradigms. The collaborative approach
of the administrative paradigm at times does not fit with the
confrontational approach of the public values paradigm. The result, it
seems, is a system oscillating arbitrarily between accommodating
rulemaking and disruptive principles-based enforcement actions. The
resurgence of principles-based enforcement actions has given rise to
renewed criticisms of “Regulation by Enforcement.” Public choice
theory would argue that these aggressive enforcement actions are
merely a response to greater public influence in the wake of a market
collapse.
But although the economic climate can create greater incentives
for regulators to punish questionable behavior, the regulatory
response is not just determined by politics. In all of the major
enforcement actions described in this Article, regulators uncovered
specific evidence of conduct that did not violate a specific rule but
transgressed a well established principle in ways that harmed the
public and the market. Regulators must construct a compelling case
of misconduct that violated fundamental public values, or rulemaking
will be the appropriate response.
Despite these constraints, regulators should do more to
synthesize the values embodied by the administrative and public
values paradigms. The regulatory scheme should embody both
predictability and a concern for public values. In deciding how to
respond to arguable misconduct, regulators should carefully consider
whether the principle they are enforcing is well established, whether
its application coheres with existing rules, whether there is compelling
evidence of misconduct, and whether the conduct targeted caused
foreseeable harm to the public. By doing so, regulators can take a
meaningful step toward harmonizing a system that relies on both
specific rules and general principles.

